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PREFACE 
 
This thesis focuses on the analysis of the effects of naïve behaviors that are 
made by present biased agents in the context of management of renewable resources. 
The conduction of an investigation, such as the one that is carried out in this 
dissertation, the aims of which are to show and demonstrate the effects derived from 
specific cognitive and behavioral peculiarities, implies to define a theoretical 
prospect of representation of the individual’s actions that must be conducted 
starting from the assumptions that effectively offer a representation of the 
behavioral traits that emerge from empirical and experimental evidences. 
Offering this representation of the economic behavior of an individual 
requires integration with the economic theory of specific cognitive features as well 
as elements of bounded rationality that depict not only the display of the attitudes 
and preferences of the agents but also gather the peculiarities of their behavior in 
relation to the context. Hence, this integration not only offers a description of the 
behaviors but also an interpretation of these, defining their nature and origins.  
In this dissertation, the activity of definition of behavioral assumptions on 
which this study and the theoretical analysis are based, occurs not only with respect 
to the cognitive dimension of the individual, but also includes the social dimension, 
where the individuals possess specific preferences that not only refer to just their 
own welfare but also include and exhibit concern for the welfare of others.    
Therefore, this thesis is framed with that process of enrichment of the 
understanding of the economic phenomenon, a process that is taking shape with the 
integration of cognitive and behavioral elements in the economic theory. It is a 
process that recomposes the puzzle that offers the representation of the actions, 
decisions and motivations of the agents, redefining the behavioral assumptions that 
present a framework that is representative and interpretative of human being’s 
economic actions. This definition of the assumptions is not bounded to offer just a 
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depiction of the observable actions but also offers an interpretative framework that 
defines the setting in which the investigation is conducted, enlarging the boundaries 
to include the social and cognitive dimensions of human behavior. Thus, this 
approach to the investigation defines a context of interrelation environment-
individuals, in whom the outcome of decisions is defined in relation both to the 
cognitive dimensions by which the environment is read and filtered, and also the 
interrelation among the individuals who live the origins and the outcomes of their 
decisions in a context of interdependence among several subjects in the same 
environment.   
 
This thesis consists of three essays that analyze and study the effects of the 
present bias in the context of harvesting from a stock of renewable resources, 
showing this effect in the individual, collective and intergenerational frameworks. 
The analysis moved in these directions because the individual, collective and 
intergenerational dimensions are the three frameworks that suffer the consequences 
of nonoptimal management of resources: firstly, the agent that suffers from myopia 
in the management is the same agent that suffers the consequences of his own bias 
with a reduction in his own welfare. This is contained in the first essay. Next in 
order is the collective dimension that is involved in a nonoptimal management of 
the resources when they are common. In fact, the myopia of the agent generates 
externality on the other members of the community who share the resources. In this 
dimension, the interdependence of the actions and the welfare between the agents 
plays a key role, and the negative externalities derived by naïve behaviors emerge 
and affect the dynamics of cooperation inside the group. This is the focus of the 
second contribution offered in this dissertation. Furthermore, frequently renewable 
resources are designed to serve the use of more generations in succession, hence, it 
is clear that externalities derived by a myopic management can affect future 
generations, whose welfare depends on the level of impoverishment to which the 
resources were previously subjected. The intergenerational context constitutes the 
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cornerstone of the third work.  
The analysis in the collective and intergenerational frameworks not only 
includes the cognitive dimension of human behavior, but has also the assumptions 
of existence of cooperative and other-regarding preferences that compose the social 
dimension of human behaviors that are effectively involved in these frameworks. 
The inclusion in the models for both the cognitive and the social dimensions 
is essential in order to include the complexity of the human decision-making 
processes, and to offer a true representation of the social intertemporal dilemmas. 
In fact, the adoption of sustainable and cooperative behaviors is strictly related to 
the degree of consciousness of the agents on the effect of their own behavior on 
others, with social preferences and other-regarding motives that, in function of the 
contexts, take form in cooperative behaviors or strong preferences for an 
intergenerational equity distribution. But these preferences are expressed by 
choices that derive from processes and decisional heuristics that involve the 
cognitive dimension of the human behavior. In fact, the choices made reflect the 
capability of correctly reading and weighting the costs and the benefits that result 
from choices and decisions. The cognitive dimension of the intertemporal decision-
making processes that direct these choices are also the path by which individuals 
solve social dilemmas expressing their own social preferences. For these reasons, 
the second and third essays of this thesis jointly include these two dimensions in 
the assumption adopted. 
 
Hence, specifically, this dissertation presents three contributions that cover 
the main contexts that are engaged by the intertemporal harvesting from a stock of 
renewable resources. 
The result is that the first contribution shows and argues that the agent’s 
lifetime welfare is reduced by implementing a strategy dominated by the 
impulsivity inherent in the present bias. This result is showed assuming the 
existence of a dual system of discount in response to short- and long-term stimuli, 
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where immediate rewards are processed by an impulsive system, while a reflective 
system is engaged in decisions about long-term rewards. 
The second essay shows that the behavior implemented by naïve agents, also 
if done with cooperative intent, can activate a dynamic of cascading defections from 
the cooperative strategy within the harvester group, where, the present biased 
preferences can trigger a strategy that directs the community to excessively increase 
the harvesting amounts despite the existence of cooperative intentions. 
Thus, the final contribution analyses the effects of the present bias in terms of 
reduction in the welfare of future generations, and shows that naïve behaviors 
conduct towards an amount of resources destined for the future generations, lesser 
than the quantity desired by the previous generation also in the presence of other-
regarding preferences towards future generations. Furthermore, the third essay 
shows that if the social preferences of the individuals are not expressed exclusively 
by the spontaneous behavior of the agent, but are also expressed through a 
compliance with specific social norms charged with representing the individual's 
social preferences and designed to offer a commitment for the agent, a mitigation 
of the effect of present bias on the intergenerational equity can occur.  
 
In conclusion, with this thesis, the important effects and the impact that naïve 
agents driven by present-biased behaviors cause in the management of renewable 
resources are shown; and hence, it is clear that the advice that emanates from these 
essays is: the present bias plays a crucial role in the context of management of 
renewable resources; the conflict between the short- and long-term benefits induce 
people towards overharvesting, that generate harm at several levels, from the 
individual’s welfare to the maintenance of cooperation in the commons and to the 
intergenerational equity. Specific institutional and social norms are required for 
facing the cognitive bias that affects the intertemporal management of renewable 
resources.   
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Chapter 1 : Present Bias in Renewable 
Resources Management Reduces Agent’s 
Welfare  
The cornerstone of this work deals with the impact that the strategy and the 
choices, implemented under the effect of present bias, has on the welfare of the 
naive agent, when he is engaged in intertemporal harvesting from a stock of 
renewable resources. The paper assumes the evidence of the existence of a dual 
system of response to short and long-term stimuli, where information about 
immediate rewards is subjected to processing by an impulsive system, while a more 
appropriate reflective system refers to decisions about long-run rewards. The paper 
thus, shows and argues that the agent’s lifetime welfare is reduced by implementing 
a strategy dominated by the impulsivity inherent in the present bias. 
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1.1 Introduction 
 
Intertemporal resources management is frequently subjected to risks of 
inefficiency and mistakes. The origin of the problem lies largely in the difficulties 
that people often face in defining intertemporal choices and allocating 
consumptions in a consistent manner over time; a consistence that implies 
conventional exponential discounting with a constant marginal rate of time 
preference. A time preference that differs from the exponential one generates time-
inconsistent plans and myopic behaviors (Strotz, 1956).  
Unfortunately, people often behave contradictory to the time-consistency 
assumption. In fact, there are a wide range of studies that underline the existence of 
non-compliant behaviors to the precepts of time consistence - for a review 
Loewenstein & Pralec (1992) and Frederick, et al. (2002). Controlled experiments 
in the laboratory have shown that people exhibit a systematic tendency to discount 
more in the near future with respect to the distant one (Loewenstein & Pralec, 1992). 
It is a result of the impulsive behavior of people in following the short-run benefit 
without giving much thought to its effects in the long run. Furthermore, the 
intertemporal choices seem to be represented better by hyperbolic discounting 
rather than by the exponential one (Laibson, 1997) and it implies that people make 
short-sighted decisions where cost and benefit are involved. These kinds of 
behaviors are interpreted as a lack of self-control or present-biased preferences 
(O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999; Laibson, 1997). 
 
This study is focused on the harvesting activities from a stock of renewable 
resources; the present bias can be an element of great impact in this context, 
particularly when the harvesting activity poses a contrast between the long-run 
choices and the short ones. For this reason, we feel the exigency of questioning the 
effects generated by myopic and present-biased agents in the context of resource 
harvesting, specifically on the impact that the present bias has on the agent’s welfare. 
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In the last few years, some studies have started to explore the application of 
the no constant-discount rate in resource management (Settle & Shogren, 2004) and 
in contexts related to the environment (Brekke & Jhoansson-Stenman, 2008; Karp, 
2005), discussing some issues related to the present-biased preferences in these 
contexts — in particular, the dichotomy between the biased agents and rational ones 
(Winkler, 2006; Hepburn, et al., 2010).  
 
However, the relationship between the present-bias and the agent's welfare 
has not been adequately explored in literature. In fact, studies on specific 
applications involving the management of renewable resource stocks, when 
addressing the basic question of behaviors and decisions related to harvesting by 
naive agents, have focused on the effects in terms of resource management 
efficiency, and resource conservation or depletion, and have implicitly assumed that 
the agent's choices will always maximize the lifetime utility. This implicit 
assumption, which in fact ignores the impact of the present bias on welfare, derives 
from not considering the naive biased/not-biased agent dichotomy as an element of 
an individual agent's system of preferences.  
In fact, addressing issues on the lifetime welfare of individuals involved in 
managing renewable resources inevitably involves a contraposition that we can 
define as a conflict of choice between those that are biased by current emotions and 
those of well-being. The second kind of choice is defined in the absence of present 
bias, that is, when the system of intertemporal discounting is oriented toward the 
overall well-being; conversely present-biased choices lead individuals to a 
calculation that is very oriented toward the short term and disregard their own long-
run preferences. This conflict is part of the decision process of the agent with the 
dichotomy biased/no-biased choice that includes both the instances in the process 
of realization of agent’s preferences.  
 
 
Present Bias in Renewable Resources Management Reduces Agent’s Welfare 
11 
1.2 A retrospective on time inconsistency and present bias 
 
Standard economic models usually assume constant discount rates when 
intertemporal choices are involved. This assumption guarantees the presence of 
time consistence such that future actions derived by the maximization of the present 
value are still the optimal ones at the time in which actions will effectively be taken. 
This consistency is guaranteed by the independence of the discount rate from the 
time. However, theoretical and experimental studies have widely shown a higher 
discount rate over the short time and a lower one in the distant one (Laibson, 1997). 
The dependence of the discount rate on the time could generate preference reversal, 
which implies that preference ordering taken at a given time can be reversed at the 
next moment, and this is imputed to the impulsivity that is coupled with the 
inadequate evaluation of the immediate rewards (Ainslie, 1992; Shefrin & Thaler, 
1988; Benabou & Pycia, 2002). 
Therefore, preference reversals generate a conflict between long-run 
preferences and immediate choices, so we have a conflict between the early 
intention of the agent and the choice made at that moment. The presence of 
preference reversals is coherent with agents who show a diminishing impatience 
such that the future is discounted with a declining discount rate (Hepburn, et al., 
2010).  
Evidence of this kind of behavior is widely underlined (Thaler, 1981; Della 
Vigna, 2009; Frederick, et al., 2002), and the large number of observations clarify 
that the time space and the passage affect choices, and thus, we have a violation of 
the stationary postulate of Koopmans (1960) — a violation that generates time 
inconsistency, because an optimal choice at time t cannot still be the optimal when 
the task is verified at a time that follows t (Strotz, 1956). 
Preference reversal, impulsive choices, and impatience in face to immediate 
rewards can be explicated in the presence of hyperbolic discount (Ainslie, 2005). It 
is also usually defined with present bias as the baseline behavior that derives from 
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hyperbolic discounting: greater impatience in the short run with a declining 
discount rate for a more distant future.  
When we are faced with present-biased preferences the immediate benefit 
steers the choices despite the long-run interest, therefore, present-biased 
preferences can lead the agent to myopic decisions and strategies. We can find 
examples of these kinds of behaviors in several frameworks, such as, the low saving 
rate (Ashraf, et al., 2006; Harris & Laibon, 2001; Laibson, 1997; Laibson, et al., 
1998); health context (Pol & Cairns, 2002); drug, smoking or buying addictions 
(Gruber & Koszegi, 2001; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Wertenbroch, 1998; Frederick, 
et al., 2002); and procrastinating behaviors (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999; Bernabou 
& Tirole, 2003). 
 
Related to the field of this study there is same contribution in the actual 
literature. Cropper and Laibson (1998) have analyzed the no-pareto efficiency in 
the issue of project evaluation when agents have inconsistent plans. Settle and 
Shogren (2004) have explored the application of the hyperbolic discount rather than 
the constant one in the context of natural resource management. Karp (2005) 
analyzes the role of hyperbolic discount in a model of global warming, which shows 
that the time-inconsistency problem is part of the hyperbolic discounting question. 
Also Brekke and Jhoansson-Stenman (2008) have analyzed the contribution that 
comes in from behavioral economics in the field of climate change, and they have 
remarked on the issue related to the present-biased preferences in the absence of 
self-control. 
It is also known that present bias is not without consequences in terms of 
externalities. In fact, Winkler (2006), shows that in the presence of hyperbolic 
discounting there is a potential conflict between economic efficiency and 
intergenerational equity in the public good investment. 
Also in the fields of the exploitation of resources, the problem connected to 
the present-biased preferences and the time inconsistency is very important. In fact, 
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under the hyperbolic discount, we can assist in the undesired collapse of the natural 
resources if the agent is naive in discounting the future (Hepburn, et al., 2010). 
However, as questioned in the introduction, the effect of present bias on agent 
welfare in the field of resources management is not posed yet. Moreover, as this 
work further shows, a strict relation between the present-bias behavior and the 
agent’s welfare exists in this context and it is strictly related to the nature of present-
bias behaviors as phenomena that are derived by a dual system of discount with the 
agent’s cognitive foundation. 
 
1.3 Origin of present bias and the dual system of discounting 
 
An evolutional origin seems to be involved in the existence of the present bias. 
In fact some authors assign the existence of myopic behavior and present bias to an 
evolutionary pressure (Godwy, et al., 2013), for example, Dasgupta and Maskin 
(2005), argue that the reason for these behaviors resides in the incertitude and 
waiting costs that have contributed to the emerging of these phenomena. 
Furthermore, to sustain the evolutionary components and roots of these 
behavioral features there are evidences that they are widely rooted in human and 
non-human animals (Ainslie, 1974; Green & Myerson, 1996).1 
To confirm the ancestral roots of such facts, there is the evidence also that the 
ability to ordinate the numbers in a cardinal order, in a correct manner, is not an 
innate ability of humans (Godwy, et al., 2013). In fact, studies conducted on 
indigenous populations of Amazonia show that such populations do not have an 
exactly numeric ordering, although they have a non-verbal numerical sense. 
Therefore, when they are asked to give a spatial ordering for increasing quantities, 
the space interval between the numbers becomes smaller and smaller (Pica, et al., 
                                                 
1However, humans show more care to the future consequences of their actions with respect to other 
animals (Frederick, et al., 2002). Even as some primates show a capability to wait and stay patient 
in order to obtain rewards, that it is not present in other species (Rosati, et al., 2007). 
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2004). Conversely, American adults offer a spatial ordering that shows an 
equidistant space between the numbers; the logarithmic spatial ordering of the 
Amazonian populations made them similar to kindergarten pupils that only in the 
second years of school arrive to space equidistantly the numbers (Stiegler & Booth, 
2004). 
Apparently this result may not appear significant with regard to the 
intertemporal discounting, but as underlined by Godwy et al. (2013), these results 
suggest that effectively non-constant discount has deep origins in the human 
behavior. Furthermore, some researches in the fields of cognitive neuroscience 
support a non-constant discount rate and find two different routes deputed to 
process the discounting: One for immediate rewards and another for the delayed 
ones. In particular, it has been identified that two distinct brain areas are related to 
the definition of intertemporal choices (McClure, et al., 2004). The first area, 
namely the limbic and paralimbic, is an area of the brain that is heavily innervated 
by the dopaminergic system and is connected to short-term rewards (Breiter & 
Rosen, 1999; Knutson, et al., 2001; McClure, et al., 2003), while the other area 
belongs to the frontoparietal region, an area that supports higher cognitive functions 
(Loewenstein, et al., 2008). What also emerges in the field of cognitive 
neuroscience experiments is the activation of the limbic circuit just before the 
choices that provide an immediate reward (McClure, et al., 2004). Similar 
conclusions have also been reached by Hariri et al. (2006) and McClure et al. (2007). 
 
In this discussion, for the sake of argument, it is worth mentioning that the 
limbic system is the seat of emotional reaction processes, which are markedly 
impulsive and emotional (Hariri, et al., 2000; Pattij & Vanderschuren, 2008), and 
that the limbic system — which is the most ancient part of our brain — also includes 
the amygdala (Isaacson, 1974), whose function is significantly correlated with 
emotional activities (Cardinala, et al., 2002; Hariri, et al., 2002). In contrast, actions 
that respect choices that take future gains into consideration do not see the prevalent 
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activation of the limbic system, in the face of the activation of the areas afferent to 
the neocortex (McClure, et al., 2004), which is the most recently formed brain area 
from an evolutionary perspective. Also, being exclusive to mammals, these areas 
are markedly developed in humans (Rachlin, 1989), and play a role in appropriate 
deliberative–cognitive activities (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Smith & Jonides, 1999). 
We can, therefore, assume that consumer choices in an intertemporal context define 
a dualism between the limbic system — whose responses are characterized by rapid 
impulsivity and emotion — with a prevalent activation of this system in response 
to short-term choices, and the deliberative–cognitive system, afferent to areas of the 
neocortex, which is slower and more weighted. 
 
The joint involvement of the two systems in the decision-making process is 
further supported by Bechara (2005), Bechara et al. (1999), Damasio (1994), and 
LeDoux (1996), who defined a distinction between the two systems of response to 
short and long-term stimuli, where information about immediate rewards is 
subjected to processing by an impulsive system, while a more appropriate reflective 
system refers to decisions about long-run rewards. Therefore it is congruous to 
assert that the process on intertemporal decision-making, and the time inconsistency 
that come out from this process, is driven by the interaction of these two coexistent 
systems, in accord with the complexity of the human nature (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988; 
Loewenstein, 1996; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). 
 
The wide variety of fields and contexts in which we find present bias, the 
evolutionary hypothesis, the psychological foundations, and the systematic 
manifestations of the phenomena of procrastination and over-consumption and the 
presence of impatience, temptation, and lacks of self-control, jointly clearly outline 
a profile of the economic behavior that resides outside the barriers of pure rational 
behavior. Hence, the present bias seems to be a specific peculiarity of decisional 
heuristics about the intertemporal choices, in frameworks where the long-run plans 
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can be subject to revision over the short run, and where the long-run outcomes 
depend on a continuum of instantaneous or short-run choices. 
Frequently resource dilemmas have the characteristics of the framework just 
cited. In fact, we are in the presence of a context in which long-run choices and 
short ones create a conflict, exposing in this manner the risks that are derived by 
the present bias. Similarly, this assertion can be extended to several environmental 
and resource issues. In particular, exploitation of renewable resources suffers from 
the risks connected to a biased way of discounting. 
 
1.4 Harvesting model 
The specifications of the harvesting model are explicated here. They describe 
the profile of exploitation of a stock of renewable resources, R(t). The dynamic of 
the growth of resources has characteristics that respond to the following equation: 
 
𝑅(𝑡 + 1) − 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡))𝑅(𝑡) − ℎ(𝑡)                                                            ( 1.1 ) 
𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡)) ≥ 0 
 
Where f(g,R(t)), with the constant g > 0 ,2 is the growth rate of the resources 
and h(t) the amount of harvested resources, at time t, such that the stock of resources 
is reduced over time, dR/dt < 0, when the exploitation rate exceeds the natural 
growth rate, h(t)/R(t) > f(g,R(t)).3 
                                                 
2 Whit R(0) > 0 that implies f(g, R(0)) > 0 and f(g, R(t)) = 0 when R(t) = 0. 
3  When ∂f(g,R(t))/∂R(t) = 0 the growth rate is a constant exponential one. 
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The lifetime of the agent is defined by the interval from 0 to T. In this model 
the resources are materials, consequently it is not possible to have a negative stock 
of resources. Furthermore the initial stock, which is strictly positive, is known by 
the agent as well as the growth rate, so we have: 
 
𝑅(𝑡) ≥ 0   ∀  𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇) 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑅0 > 0                                                                        ( 1.2 ) 
Where R0 is the initial stock at time 0. 
 
The amount harvested is not restorable in the stock of renewable resources, 
such that: 
ℎ(𝑡) ≥ 0    ∀  𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇)                                                                                                    ( 1.3 ) 
 
With regard to the constraints, the agent is subjected to a capacity constraint 
and a resource constraint. The capacity constraint implies that in each period the 
agent cannot harvest an amount of resources greater than hmax, a value that is strictly 
positive and finite, for which, coupled with non-restorable condition, implies: 
 
0 ≤ ℎ(𝑡) ≤ ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥    ∀ 𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇)   𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 > 0                                              ( 1.4 ) 
With regard to the resource constraint, the agent cannot harvest at time t more 
than the amount of resources available in the stock at the same time t, hence: 
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ℎ(𝑡) ≤ 𝑅(𝑡)  ∀ 𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇)                                                                                            ( 1.5 ) 
 
Moreover, the system defined excludes the situation of no possible reduction 
in the stock of resources. It is a condition in which the agent is effectively facing a 
dilemma about management of the resources. Hence, given the initial stock of 
resources, the horizontal time, and the growth rate, it is impossible for the agent to 
have a stock of resources where he will be in a position to always harvest at hmax. 
 
In the model there is no exchange market, so the agent’s welfare depends only 
on the amount harvested and enjoyed, time after time. Moreover, the utility function 
of the agent is, as usual, defined in the following manner: 
 
𝑈 = ∑ 𝛿(𝑡)𝑢(ℎ(𝑡))𝑇𝑡=0                                                                                                      ( 1.6 ) 
 
Where u(h(t)) is monotonic and strictly concave on h(t) in the interval (0, hmax): 
 
𝑢′(ℎ𝑡) > 0   𝑢
′′(ℎ𝑡) < 0                                                                                                    ( 1.7 ) 
The discount factor δ(t) represents the degree of impatience of the agent for 
harvesting. The agent has an impatience such that: 
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𝛿(𝑡)
𝛿(𝑡+1)
> 1  ∀ 𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇)                                                                                                      (1.8) 
 
Therefore, the assumptions exclude the case of pleasure in procrastination, 
that is when δ'(t) > 0, or neutrality in the harvesting time.4 
The optimal solution it is so given by the maximization of the utility function 
( 1.6 ) under the constrain expressed in ( 1.2 ), ( 1.4 ), ( 1.5 ) and with the dynamics 
of the resources that respect the features express in ( 1.1 ). 
Finally, we assume continuity for the harvesting amount on the interval (0, 
hmax), given the discount factors Φ={δ(0), … , δ(t), … , δ(T)}, which respond to the 
assumption of the model we have, hence each time the agent defines just one 
optimal solution of the problem of maximization.  
Therefore, at time 0 the agent formulates his optimal harvesting strategy: 
 
𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇)}                                                           ( 1.9 ) 
The optimal harvesting strategy evaluated in the absence of present bias 
guarantees time consistency of the future decision and also corresponds to the long-
run best harvesting plan for the agent. However, it is known that the present bias 
does not give guarantees on the time consistency of the choices time after time. In 
                                                 
4 Neutrality implies 𝛿′(𝑡) = 0   𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ
𝛿(𝑡)
𝛿(𝑡+1)
= 1    ∀ 𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇). 
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this manner, the strategy effectively implemented by a biased agent does not 
coincide with the long-run optimal one. The issue here is, how and in what way will 
the adoption of a biased strategy, instead of an optimal long-run one, affect the 
agent’s welfare during his entire lifetime. 
 
1.5 Present-biased harvesting and agent welfare 
 
In the standard rational model, the agent is able to accurately define his exact 
optimal path of harvesting, keeping his bond with the initial optimal strategy 
formulated at the beginning, and he will do this throughout his life. As explicated 
before, it implies that the discount factor must be expressed in an exponential 
manner that guarantees time consistence. However, this is not so in our case. Here 
the model assumes that the agent shows present-biased preferences, in order to 
show the consequences in terms of lower welfare. 
An agent shows present-biased preferences at time t when the following hold: 
 
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+1
>
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+1
   𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑡 < 𝑠   and     𝑡, 𝑠 ∈ (0, 𝑇)                                                      ( 1.10 ) 
 
Thus, equation ( 1.10 ) totally excludes the possibility of time consistency.5 
The derived implication is that the amount effectively harvested at time s, hs, is 
                                                 
5 Time consistency implies 
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+𝑛
=
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+𝑛
  ∀𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇)  and ∀ 𝑠 ∈ (0, 𝑇). Only when the discounting 
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greater than the amount predicted for the same period when the optimal strategy 
was evaluated at time t, that is hsopt, hence, we have: 
 
ℎ𝑠 > ℎ𝑠
𝑜𝑝𝑡 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 ℎ𝑠
𝑜𝑝𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡                                                                                     ( 1.11 ) 
 
Therefore, the focus is on the amount that the biased agent harvests at each 
period. The harvesting amount by the agent for each period is defined by the Hbias 
strategy: 
 
𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑇)}                                                 ( 1.12 ) 
 
Hbias is defined with the amounts that are derived time after time by the 
instantaneous maximization of the utility function as expressed in ( 1.6 ), when the 
discount factor responds to the present bias features expressed in ( 1.10 ), under the 
constraints previously exposed. 
Thus, the present bias, time after time, generates an increase in the amount 
harvested compared to what was previously defined, with a lower resources level 
that conducts to a more rapid impoverishment of the resources and to a lower 
amount of resources available overall for the consumption of the agent. Therefore, 
                                                 
strictly respects this condition, the agent’s evaluation of the optimal strategy in every period s 
between 0 and T conducts to the same optimal harvesting strategy evaluated in any period t, 
belonging to (0,T). 
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under the present bias assumption, because ( 1.11 ) holds for effect of ( 1.10 ), the 
agent harvests an amount greater than the optimal one evaluated without the bias. 
This implies that, in presence of present-biased preferences, the total amount 
harvested in the case of a positive growth rate of resources following the Hbias 
strategy will be less that the optimal one, following Hopt. Of course given the nature 
of the stock of renewable resources, a higher amount harvested at a given time 
reduces the stock that can proliferate, so it reduces the maximum amount harvested 
in future; and it is clear that any Hbias strategy cannot conduct to a total amount 
harvested, ∑ ℎ(𝑡)𝑇𝑡=0 ,that is bigger than the amount harvested with an Hopt strategy, 
when δ'(t) < 0 and ( 1.10 ) holds, so we have: 
 
ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑠) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑠)  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ ∑ ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=0 < ∑ ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=0                               ( 1.13 ) 
 
It is seen that the present bias, with the task of harvesting from a stock of 
renewable resources, conducts the agent outside by the optimal harvesting path, 
reducing the total amount of resources enjoyed during his total lifetime. 
However, the question is does the reduction of this amount and a different 
harvesting profile determined by the present bias imply a reduction in the welfare 
of the agent given his preferences? — if so, which preferences? We are faced with 
two different strategies that respond to two different systems of discounting: - 1 - 
The strategy that responds to the short-run, expressed by Hbias, where the amount 
harvested at each period is affected by the present bias re-evaluating the harvesting 
plan time after time, and - 2 - the long-run strategy, Hopt, where the plan of 
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harvesting formulated at time zero excludes the effect of the present bias and is 
confirmed each time.6 
Thus, it will be seen that the utility that the agent receives from the amount 
harvested is greater in the optimal harvesting strategy and not in the biased one. In 
fact, the peculiarities of the utility functions about concavity and monotonicity 
expressed in ( 1.7 ), determine that the utility derived by the increase in the 
harvesting at a given period, implied by the presence of the present bias, is inferior 
to the loses of utility given by the difference between the total amount that will be 
harvested, in theory, in the future with the optimal harvesting strategy and the 
amount that will effectively be harvested under the present-bias hypothesis. Hence 
we have: 
 
𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏)) − 𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)) < ∑ {𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) − 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡))}
𝑇
𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1
       ( 1.14 ) 
 
Therefore, the increasing of utility derived by a higher amount in the present 
is lower than the decreeing of the utility derived from the amount enjoyed in the 
future. 
This is the result of the adoption of a harvesting plan that is inferior to the 
harvesting plan defined by the Hopt strategy. Moreover, it is the present bias that is 
the element that generates this result. In order to show this assentation, it is helpful 
to use a utility function largely adopted for assuming present bias preferences that 
                                                 
6 It clear that in order to define what is it better for the agent we need to appeal to the concept of the 
lifetime interest of the agent. In fact if we consider the welfare of the agent, we need to have as 
temporal references his entire lifetime, and consequently the strategy that represents the welfare of 
the agent is the strategy that better fits the interest of the agent throughout his life. 
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offer the essential peculiarity of the present bias. 7  Therefore, the present bias 
preference finds expression in the following intertemporal utility function: 
 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝑢(ℎ(𝑡)) + 𝛽 ∑ 𝛿
𝜏−𝑡𝑢(ℎ(𝑡)) 𝑇𝜏=𝑡+1                                                                 ( 1.15 ) 
 
where β, not greater than 1, represents the present bias. When β = 1 the 
discounting guarantee time consistency (absence of present bias) with an 
exponential discount factor, consequently determines the optimal strategy. It is 
trivial to show that when β is less than 1 ( 1.10 ) holds. Sustaining the welfare 
derived from the optimal strategy is greater than that which the biased one implies 
— Ut(Hopt) > Ut(Hbias). It is helpful to remember that Hopt, because it is the optimal 
solution to the problem of maximization, is the harvesting profile, which, when 
given the features and the dynamics of the resources, does not have the possibility 
of having profiles of harvesting that can determine a greater utility. Hence, defined 
with {H} the set of all possible harvesting profiles, where a generic profile is 
defined as Hi ={hi(0),…, hi(t),…,hi(T)} will be 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 ≻ 𝐻𝑖 . such that: 
 
𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) + ∑ 𝛿
𝜏−𝑡𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) 
𝑇
𝜏=𝑡+1 > 𝑢(ℎ𝑖(𝑡)) + ∑ 𝛿
𝜏−𝑡𝑢(ℎ𝑖(𝑡)) 
𝑇
𝜏=𝑡+1   ( 1.16 ) 
 
It is very clear that because the harvesting profile derived from the biased 
strategy, Hbias, it is one of the profiles inside {H} and it is alternative to Hopt, it will 
                                                 
7 This form of present biased preferences was originally used by Phelps and Pollak (1968) in the 
intergeneration context. 
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be 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 ≻ 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠. Furthermore, because the utility derived from the biased strategy 
is defined as in (15), the presence of the present bias expressed with β lower than 1 
determines the lower utility for the agent: 
 
𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) + ∑ 𝛿
𝜏−𝑡𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)) 
𝑇
𝜏=𝑡+1 > 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) + 𝛽 ∑ 𝛿
𝜏−𝑡𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) 
𝑇
𝜏=𝑡+1         (1.17 ) 
 
It is, hence, evident that the long-run strategy generates greater lifetime 
welfare. Furthermore, it is very clear that between the short-run biased strategy and 
the long-run ones are the second ones that better fit the lifetime welfare of the agent, 
in relation to his preferences. It is also the origin of the two different strategies that 
determines that the long-run strategy must be the reference point in order to evaluate 
the welfare of the agent. 
In the first instance, as discussed at the start, because the choices made under 
the impulse of the present bias respond to a decisional system strongly influenced 
by the emotional component of judgment, the present-biased choices are the 
impulsive ones, where the overall effects on advantages and disadvantages that 
derive by the actions made are evaluated with a strong weight of the impulsive and 
emotional components of the system of decision-making. These strong emotional 
decisions are not totally mediated by the cognitive–deliberative component of the 
decisional system, and it is the cognitive–deliberative part of our reasoning that 
enables us to accurately evaluate the delayed rewards and losses that occur in the 
future, as a consequence of our immediate actions. It is very clear, when faced with 
two mutually excludable set of strategies — the optimal harvesting path and the 
biased strategy — it is the first one that leads to the greater welfare of the agent, 
where his welfare is evaluated taking into consideration all the benefits that he has 
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enjoyed during his lifetime. This is completed with the high cognitive faculties used 
by the cognitive–deliberative system of decision-making, which plays the role of a 
controller of the impulse of immediate desire, in order to guarantee greater utility 
enjoyment derived from the consumption of the resources harvested over time. In 
the long-run strategy, in fact, the welfare of the individual is defined by the amount 
harvested in each period that is not affected time after time by the strong emotional 
component of the decision-making system underlying the present-bias phenomena, 
but it is the result of a more weighted choice between the cognitive–deliberative 
system and the emotional-affective one. Hence, the malevolent contribution that 
present bias brings to the individual welfare is unequivocal. 
 
1.6 Discussion and final remarks 
 
Having addressed issues related to present bias and the welfare of the agent, 
has primarily highlighted the presence of two different discount systems in 
individual decision-making, 
weakening, therefore, the assumption that individual choices will inevitably 
maximize the lifetime utility in the intertemporal management of renewable 
resources. The assumption that the agent's preferences are solely those manifested 
and revealed, and that they axiomatically lead to the maximization of individual 
well-being, in itself dismisses, a priori, questions about the effect of present bias on 
the agent's welfare, identifying along with the strategies derived from present-
biased choices the same agent's preferences that maximize the life-time utility. 
From this axiomatization derives the basis on which the analysis is founded on the 
existence of two distinct representative agents: the biased (naive) agent and the 
agent who is unaffected by such a bias or who is capable of preventing it (a 
complicated or rational agent). The clear separation between the two types of 
Present Bias in Renewable Resources Management Reduces Agent’s Welfare 
27 
representative agents is the reason why it has excluded the presence of non-biased 
preferences when dealing with naive behaviors. 
The implicit axiomatization just described appears reasonable, but only to the 
extent that the existence of a dual system of intertemporal discount of individual 
agents — a long-run and a short-run influenced by the effects of bias — is ignored.  
 
The discount system is expressed by the coexistence of the two discount 
forms, which include an emotional, rapid and impulsive system for responding to 
short-term stimuli, and a reflective system suitable for the long term. This system 
of intertemporal discount is consistent with — and is a part of — the complexity of 
decision-making that characterizes human beings, who respond to the simultaneous 
existence of a highly integrated decision-making system, composed of two main 
systems: The affective-emotional system, where the emotional component is 
predominant in the dynamics of decision-making and the cognitive–deliberative 
system, which is delegated to greater mediation in defining what actions to take, 
relative to the input received. Questions and interests focusing on the effects of 
naive behavior and on the welfare of performing it, is thus well-founded. 
 
Therefore, when considering the relationship between the agent's naive 
behavior, present bias, and lifetime utility we should proceed in an orderly manner, 
by highlighting first of all the manner in which the two different discount rates lead 
to implementation of two different strategies, both responsive to the agent's 
preferences, and arising from the two systems of intertemporal discount: Short-run 
or biased versus long-run or optimal. When faced with renewable resources, putting 
in place one or the other strategy generates different harvesting profiles; both 
strategies generate the collection of different amounts at different periods. From the 
different distributions of enjoyment in the periods of the two strategies, and from 
the total amount enjoyed over the entire lifetime, which is lower in the case of a 
biased discount, the need to address the problem of the influence of present bias 
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arises, not only in terms of maintaining the level of resources, but also in terms of 
maximizing the welfare of the individual, who, when acting on the spur of the 
present bias, reduces the utility he could benefit from his entire lifetime, and who 
is therefore, ultimately, not effectively maximizing his own welfare, as this work 
has shown it. 
 
Furthermore, to qualify the problem of maximizing the lifetime utility, it 
should be noted that the process of distributing consumption over time does not per 
se include any element to balance the two discount systems (short-run biased and 
optimal long-run) because the determination of the intertemporal discount actually 
used is not a decision-making act within the problem of maximization (also not 
being a full deliberative choices), because the definition of the discount used 
depends on the prevalence of the impulsive system rather than the reflective one, 
independent determination, that it is defined a priori with respect to the problem of 
defining the amount to be harvested during the different periods, that it is the 
problem of maximizing the utility. Maximization, therefore, only works when 
limited to the context defined by the system reacting — in this case, the short-term 
— making it not the most ideal for maximizing the welfare of the individual for all 
the periods that are involved in, with contexts that are defined to include both 
strategies — short-term and long-term —  belonging to the individual's system of 
preference. 
 
In the light of these final considerations and the analyses presented, I am led 
to assert that when faced with complex decision-making involving intertemporal 
choice in renewable resources management, the prevalence of naive behavior, that 
is strongly influenced by the emotional-affective system, leads, as a consequence 
of the cognitive bias, to a reduction in the life-time utility enjoyed by the individual. 
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This paper has demonstrated this assertion, primarily by comparing the two 
strategies and specifically by comparing the difference in the utility gained. It has 
shown that the instantaneous utility, relating to increased harvesting due to present 
bias taken at the present time (for as long as the stock of resources allows more 
harvesting in a biased strategy compared to an optimal strategy), is lower than the 
utility decreased that occur when the remaining resource stock leads to resource 
gathering, in the remaining periods, that is lower for a biased strategy than for the 
unbiased one. Against this background, it is therefore inevitable to pose the initial 
question, that asks if the intertemporal discount applied will actually pay due regard 
to the entire span of enjoyment in the long-run; noting the purpose of effective 
intertemporal maximization of well-being and given the set of all periods of 
harvesting that compose its lifetime. In this respect it should be noted that a strategy 
derived from present bias is, by its very nature, not sufficient to allow a definition 
of effective maximization of the individual's overall well-being, who, when put in 
a position he cannot cope with the excessive impulsive component in the immediate 
present, assists a reduction in his overall welfare. It follows from this that the 
presence of present bias undermines the principle that an individual will, using his 
own biased choices, automatically correctly maximize his overall well-being 
according to his own preferences. Hence, the reduced welfare, by implementing a 
strategy dominated by the impulsivity inherent in present bias, highlights problems 
that are not only relevant to maintaining a given level of resources in the face of 
naive behavior in harvesting activities, but also the need to identify tools that can 
ensure effective implementation of strategies to neutralize the effects of present bias 
when managing renewable resources in terms of individual well-being. 
Three Essays in Behavioral Economics that Investigate the Effects of Present Bias in the Management of 
Renewable Resources 
Chapter 2 : Cascading Defections from 
Cooperation Triggered by Present-Biased 
Behaviors in the Commons 
 
The query raised in this work is concerned with the fact that defective 
behaviors from the cooperative equilibrium in the management of common 
resources can be fueled and triggered by the presence of agents with myopic 
behaviors, a similar phenomenon is also possible with cooperative motivations. 
This paper discusses that the apparent and detectable decay of the cooperative 
choices in the dilemmas of common resources are not an exclusive and indisputable 
signal of an escalation in free-riding intentions, but can also be an outcome of the 
present-biased preferences and myopic behaviors of the cooperative agents.  
In fact, within the context peopled by conditional cooperators with a 
heterogeneous myopic discount factor, in the absence of promoting coordination 
and in the light of the absence of information, the present-biased preferences can 
trigger a strategy that directs the community to excessively increase its harvesting 
level, even in presence of the other-regarding motives include cooperation.  
The behavior implemented by naïve agents, also if done with cooperative 
intent, can activate a dynamic of cascading defections from the cooperative strategy 
within the harvester group. Therefore, a lowering of the cooperative behaviors can 
also be the effect of the absence of coordination instruments in response to the 
cognitive bias that influences human behaviors. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
In the face of the task of managing the common resources, one of the main 
issues that a community faces is to avoid the trigger of the tragedy of the commons. 
A ‘not-collapsing’ management of the commons greatly depends upon the 
cooperative capacities of the communities and their ability to maintain over time 
the cooperation inside the group. 
Cooperative behaviors have been greatly individuated and investigated by 
behavioral economics (Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Gächter, 2006; Sally, 1995), and 
other-regarding and social preferences are found in everyday life, giving evidence 
that individuals exhibit care with concepts such as fairness (Gintis, 2000), and adopt 
prosocial behaviors in a wide range of situations (Meier & Stutzer, 2008; Frey & 
Meier, 2004; Alpizar, et al., 2008) and within different cultures (Henrich, et al., 
2004). However, also in the presence of social preferences regarding cooperation, 
when individuals participate in a common pool resources or public good game, 
frequently, in the absence of coordination and enforcement instruments or 
institutions, a decay of cooperative behaviors occurs (Gintis, 2000; Gintis, et al., 
2003; Andreoni, 1988; Isaac, et al., 1994; Dawes & Thaler, 1988; Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999; Ledyard, 1995). Such decay occurs also because a substantial number of 
individuals often cooperate only if others also cooperate (conditional cooperators); 
therefore, the presence of free-riders or individuals without showing full 
cooperative behaviors can trigger a dynamic of defection by cooperation 
(Fischbacher & Gachter, 2010; Fischbacher, et al., 2001). However, when resources 
management includes specific intertemporal peculiarities with relevant externalities, 
and when the goal is to avoid the trigger of a tragedy of commons, the will of the 
cooperation requires the support of the capability of well-managed resources over 
time. In fact, resource harvesting is also vulnerable to the risks of inefficiency in 
intertemporal management, as it results from the difficulties that people often 
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encounter in defining inter temporal choices and allocating the consumptions in a 
consistent manner over time. This phenomenon is closely connected with the 
existence of the present-biased preferences (Loewenstein & Pralec, 1992). In fact, 
present bias is referred to all the contexts in which individuals, due to their 
impulsivity, follow short-term benefits without considering adequately the long-
term consequences, particularly in situations in which the individuals 
systematically behave by discounting more near futures respect to the distant one 
(Loewenstein & Pralec, 1992). The implication is that individuals make short-
sighted decisions when they perform the cost-benefit balancing tasks over time. 
These behaviors clearly reveal the lack of self-control in the face of the pressure of 
the present (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999; Laibson, 1997). It occurs to such a degree 
that in the face of the present-biased preferences the immediate benefit directs the 
choices despite the long-run interest. This is true also in the case of social dilemma: 
in Herr et al. (1997), for example, participants interact in a common pool resources 
experiment that reveals a lower efficiency when the experimental design provides 
intertemporal externalities, manifesting a fundamental short-sighted behavior. 
Participants, in fact, do not adequately consider the future consequences of their 
decisions, and their short-sighted behaviors in dynamic games were also 
highlighted by Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin (2010).    
 
Myopic behavioral patterns are particularly dangerous in the context of 
common resources, because they can exacerbate the tragedy of the commons, and 
generate rapid resource depletion. It, therefore, becomes necessary to investigate 
the issue of cooperation in the commons when the agents suffer from myopia 
resulting from present-biased preferences. In fact, generally, common resource 
dilemmas are defined within a context in which the long run choices and short ones 
can come into conflict, thus exposing the resources to the risks that are an outcome 
of present-bias. Thus, the role played by present-bias in the decay dynamics of 
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cooperation in commons could be consistent with the systematic decadence of the 
cooperative propensity with the passage of time and with the prosecution of the 
interactions between the agents, in fact, one of the salient elements that is present 
in the common resources experiment is the progressive decay of the cooperative 
bahaviors with the advancement of the interactions (Ostrom, 2000).  
 
The great relevance regarding the causes that generate the decay of 
cooperation in the commons result from the observation that when resources are 
common in their intrinsic nature with intertemporal harvesting peculiarities, the 
decay of cooperation intentions can be the main obstacle to the preservation of a 
given stock of resources, with the consequence that it is easily possible to define in 
terms of the reduction in the community welfare. However, in this context, the role 
played by the cognitive biases is not adequately investigated. The question if and in 
what manner such phenomena like present-bias can affect the dynamics of the 
cooperation and its eventual decadence is yet to be raised. It is also remarkable that 
if on the one hand it is beyond any doubt regarding the existence of cooperation 
capability and that this is part of the human evolution success (Gintis, 2009), on the 
other hand the reason why societies sometimes fail to achieve the level of fairness 
and cooperation that they desire still remain unclear. Therefore, this paper presents 
a representation of human behaviors that do not exclude these cognitive foundations 
of the process of decision-making in the intertemporal context. Without the 
necessary inclusions of the intertemporal cognitive features of the human behavior, 
the models used to describe the human phenomena in the resources harvesting are 
unable to include the effective and real issues that can trigger the defective 
strategies by cooperation in the management of the common resources and generate 
overexploitation of the resources. 
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2.2 Present bias, dual system of discounting and the reasons to 
take care of it in light of cooperation in the commons 
 
Present-bias refers to behaviors that result from the duality of the discount 
rate in the short-term and long-term periods, that determines, in tasks which require 
intertemporal planning, a non-consistency time behavior. A time inconsistency 
situation implies that an optimal choice defined at the present could be revisited in 
the future (Strotz, 1956). The present bias thus determines the emergence of 
preference reversals that generates a conflict between the long run preferences and 
immediate choices, resulting so in a conflict between the early intention of the agent 
and the choice made at the moment. The genesis of these phenomena is not casual 
and has a solid cognitive foundation. In fact, considering the nature of the present-
biased behavior it is noteworthy that researches in the fields of cognitive 
neuroscience support a non-constant discount rate finding two different ways 
deputed to process the discounting: one for the immediate rewards and another for 
the delayed ones (McClure, et al., 2004). In fact, it is possible to identify two distinct 
brain areas related to the definition of intertemporal choices. The first area, namely 
the limbic and paralimbic, is a brain region heavily innervated by the dopaminergic 
system and connected to rewards expectation (Breiter & Rosen, 1999; Knutson, et 
al., 2001; McClure, et al., 2003), while the other area belongs to the front-parietal 
region, a part that supports the higher cognitive functions (Loewenstein, et al., 
2008). The McClure and collegues’ experiment reveals an activation of the limbic 
circuit just prior to the choices that provide immediate reward. Similar conclusions 
were also drawn by Hariri et al., (2006) and McClure et al. (2007).  
The first area is the seat of the emotional reaction processes (Hariri, et al., 
2000) and impulsive behaviors (Pattij & Vanderschuren, 2008); in fact the limbic 
system - the most ancient part of human’s brain – also includes the amygdala 
(Isaacson, 1974) a, whose functions are closely related to emotional activities 
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(Cardinala, et al., 2002; Hariri, et al., 2002). Viceversa, the second area, that it is 
afferent to the neocortex, the most recently formed brain area from an evolutionary 
perspective, shows prevalent activation in correspondence of actions that are the 
outcome of choices that take future gains into consideration best; this second area, 
exclusive to mammals and distinctly developed in humans (Rachlin, 1989), plays a 
key role in appropriate deliberative-cognitive activities.  
The joint involvement of the two systems in decision-making processes is 
further supported by Bechara (2005), Bechara et al., (1999), Damasio (1994) and 
LeDoux (1996); therefore, for consumer choices, in particular, which are defined in 
an intertemporal context, the dualism between the limbic system and the 
deliberative-cognitive system of the neocortex highlights a distinction between the 
two systems of responses to short and long-term stimuli, where information 
regarding immediate rewards is subjected to processing by an impulsive system, 
whilst a more appropriate reflective system refers to decisions regarding long run 
rewards. Hence, the system of duality in the application of discounts factors in the 
short and long-term finds a solid cognitive explanation; this means that the present 
bias is an element of the decisional processes deeply rooted in the human nature, 
and explains the rather great diffusion of these behavioral traits in several ambits of 
an individual’s life. In fact, the present biased behaviors are also clearly evident in 
several situations (Thaler, 1981; Della Vigna, 2009; Frederick, et al., 2002) and 
different contexts, such as the low saving rate (Ashraf, et al., 2006; Harris & Laibon, 
2001; Laibson, 1997; Laibson, et al., 1998), health context (Pol & Cairns, 2002), 
drugs, smoking or buying addictions (Gruber & Koszegi, 2001; Thaler & Shefrin, 
1981; Wertenbroch, 1998; Frederick, et al., 2002), and procrastination behaviors 
(O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999; Bernabou & Tirole, 2003).The unifying factor in all 
these fields, and one that is effective and greatly relevant for the emergence of the 
present biased behaviors, is the contrasting dichotomy between the long-term well-
being and immediate enjoyment. Present-bias seems, therefore, to be a specific 
peculiarity of decision heuristics on intertemporal choices, in frameworks where 
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the long-term plans can be subject to revision over the short, and where the long-
term outcomes depend upon a continuum of instantaneous or short-term choices. 
 
The features described above regarding the context where present-bias 
emerges also clearly define the framework of common resource dilemmas. In fact, 
the intertemporal management of the commons has the characteristics of the 
framework in which the long-term choices and short-term ones can be conflicting, 
and exposes the resources to the risks that are derived from present-bias. It is 
remarkable that in the fields of the resources exploitation the present-bias and naïve 
behaviors could prove very dangerous for the maintenance of the resources, in fact 
in the absence of time consistency an undesired collapse of the natural resources 
could occur (Hepburn et al., 2010). Therefore, because effectively present-bias is 
an element that significantly affects every single sphere of human behaviors, when 
a conflict arises between the short and long-term interests, when the management 
of the common resources must be studied, it is important analyze and seriously pay 
attention to issues that emerge from investigations of the intertemporal dimension 
of human behavior with the myopic and biased features that characterize the human 
decision-making processes.  
However, it is well known that the commons is a field of study in which the 
relevant elements of human choosing are not limited to the area of intertemporal 
resources management, but also one in which human sociality plays a crucial role: 
in fact, on the one hand, the adoption of sustainable and cooperative behavior in 
relevant social dilemmas depends, by the degree of consciousness, on the effect of 
their own behaviors on others, showing interest and care for the common resources. 
This inclination finds form in cooperative and other-regarding motives. On the other 
hand, the choices made reflect the capability of correctly reading and weighting the 
costs and the benefits that result from one’s own choices and decisions. The 
intertemporal decision-making processes, that direct these choices are also the path 
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by which individuals solve social dilemmas. Within this process the social 
preferences also find realization. It is also evident that the cognitive aspects and 
behavioral traits of the intertemporal choices, such as present-bias, are fundamental 
elements required to offer a representation of social dilemmas. 
It is for these reasons that the cooperative dynamics and intertemporal ones 
need to be analyzed together. But in this work before investigating the role played 
by present-bias in the defective dynamics from cooperation in the collective 
harvesting from a stock of resources, the cooperative nature of people is useful to 
cite. In fact, the contributions, in order to understand the role of other-regarding 
preferences in the social dilemmas, are abundant in the literature and reveal that the 
cooperation and fairness principle contributes to the formulation of the agent's 
choices (Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Gachter, 2007; Ostrom, et al., 1994). Several works 
have investigated the true foundations of economics when the actors take decisions 
within a social context, showing with undisputed clarity that the individual’s 
decisions are mediated by other-regarding motives and by prosocial concepts like 
fairness, cooperation and reciprocity (Andreoni, 1990; Rabin, 1993; Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Falk & 
Fischbacher, 2006). Furthermore, recently, the consequences of the introductions of 
the other-regarding preferences in the theoretical frameworks on the management 
of the commons draws great attention and offers additional elements of analysis 
also for application in environmental and resources issues (Godwy, 2008; Frey & 
Stutzer, 2006; Gsottbauer & Bergh, 2011; Carlsson & Johansson-Stenman, 2012; 
Brekke & Jhoansson-Stenman, 2008); and in the specific fields of commons several 
analysis and investigations have confirmed the ability of human beings to 
voluntarily sustain the cooperation in resources dilemmas (Fehr & Leibbrandt, 2013; 
Casari & Plott, 2003; Charness & Villeval, 2009; Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011; 
Ostrom, et al., 1992).  
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However, we cannot merely emphasize the presence of the cooperative wills 
of the individuals; there is also a need to truly comment on the frequent observations, 
especially in the field of controlled experiments, of a systematic decadence of 
cooperative propensity over time and with the prosecution of the interactions among 
the agents (Ostrom, 2000), the reason for the decay of the cooperation propensity 
over time is an argument of discussion and great interest. This decay is of great 
relevance, not merely theoretically, but also from the perspective applied: it is 
known that when confronted with resources, which are intrinsically commons and 
having an intertemporal harvesting peculiarity, the decay of the cooperation 
instances can become the main obstacle to the preservation of a given stock of 
common resources over time and generations. However, in this context, the part 
played by the cognitive biases has not been adequately explored. If and in which 
manner phenomena such as present-bias can affect the dynamics of the cooperation 
acts and its eventual decadence continues to remain unclear. But if, as has been 
discussed, the dynamics of harvesting in the commons has a double determination 
of the harvesting path that involves both the cognitive sphere of the individual and 
the related capability of managing decisions in an intertemporal framework in the 
social sphere,  which is defined in the cooperative attitude, it becomes clear that this 
is the reason for the opinion that there are cognitive factors which affect the 
intertemporal foresight of the agents which can be involved in a decadence of 
cooperative interaction over time and within a framework that includes common 
resources, even when agents have preferences for cooperation. Therefore, in the 
following section of this work, the important effects that present-bias has in the 
dynamics of defection by cooperation will be considered. In particular, this study 
will show in what manner the present-bias is involved in the triggering of strategies 
that contributes to a no cooperative behavior in common harvesting, determining 
cascading defections. 
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2.3 Harvesting model and behavioral assumptions 
 
The focus of this work regarding the events that occur in the presence of 
present-bias in a context in which the common resources for their properties have 
intertemporal peculiarities; therefore, all the specifications of the harvesting model 
and the behavioral assumptions are defined in order to highlight the role that 
present-bias can play in the triggering of a defection strategy by the cooperative 
rules in the commons. 
 
2.3.1.  The resources and harvesting features of the model 
 
The baseline features of the harvesting model involve a model of exploitation 
of a stock of renewable resources, where the stock of resources at time t is R(t) with 
0≤t≤T and the quantity harvested is expressed as h(t). The fundamental equation 
that determines the dynamics of the growth of the resources subject to the 
harvesting is as follows: 
 
𝑅(𝑡 + 1) − 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡))𝑅(𝑡) − ℎ(𝑡) (2. 1 ) 
 
With f(g,R(t))≥0, and g>0, so the stock of resources grows at a non-negative rate.8 
 
The time interval from 0 to T is the finite lifetime of a single agent. Moreover, 
the initial stock of resources and the growth rate are known by all the agents. 
                                                 
8 The resources of the stock are not perishable, from this peculiarity derives the non-negative growth 
rate. And when ∂f(g,R(t)/∂R(t)=0 the growth rate is a constant exponential one. 
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Resources are assumed materials; therefore, as it is not possible to have 
negative stocks of resources: 
 
𝑅(𝑡) ≥ 0    ∀  𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇)  ( 2.2 ) 
 
The initial stock at time zero is strictly positive and represented by: 
 
𝑅(0) = 𝑅0  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑅0 > 0 ( 2.3 ) 
 
Regarding the conditions of the harvesting activity, the amount harvested at 
time t by the agent, represented by h(t), is not restorable in the stock of renewable 
resources. Therefore: 
 
ℎ(𝑡) ≥ 0  ∀ 𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇)  ( 2.4 ) 
 
The agent faces a capacity constraint, in such a manner that in each period he 
cannot harvest a quantity of resources greater than hmax, a value that is strictly 
positive and finite, and thus, together with the non-negative constraint, it is 
expressed as: 
 
0 ≤ ℎ(𝑡) ≤ ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥     ∀  𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇)    𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ   ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 > 0  ( 2.5 ) 
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Furthermore, each agent also faces a resources constraint, such that he cannot 
harvest at time t more than the stock of resources available at the given time t: 
 
ℎ(𝑡) ≤ 𝑅(𝑡)    ∀ 𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇) ( 2.6 ) 
 
Both the capacity and resources constraints are assumed to be exogenous and 
equal for all the agents. 
 
2.3.2.  Agent preferences and behaviors 
 
The model assumes only the material resources and no exchange market; with 
this simplification it can be assumed that the welfare of the agents depends only 
upon the amount of resources harvested and enjoyed at the time of harvesting, h(t), 
so that the lifetime utility of the agent evaluated at time 0 is as follows: 
 
𝑈 = ∑𝛿(𝑡) 𝑢(ℎ(𝑡))
𝑇
𝑡=0
 
 
( 2.7 ) 
 
Regarding the agent's preferences, it is that they are monotonic and strictly 
concave on the amount harvested: 9 
𝑢′(ℎ𝑡) > 0     𝑢
′′(ℎ𝑡) < 0    ∀ ℎ ∈ ℛ
+     ( 2.8 ) 
                                                 
9 In this way the existence of a unique optimal solution is guaranteed.  
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The discount factor δ(t) represents the degree of impatience on harvesting, 
regarding which it is assumed that agent exhibits impatience on the harvesting time, 
such that 𝛿′ < 0,10 so the discount factor is monotonic and decreasing over time,11 
with: 
 
𝛿(𝑡) > 𝛿(𝑡 + 1)  ∀𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇) ( 2.9 ) 
  
Hence, to summarize the problem of the optimal harvesting path, it is the 
system expressed by the maximization of the utility function ( 2.7 ) under the 
constraints expressed in ( 2.2 ),  ( 2.5 ) and ( 2.6 ) when the initial condition and the 
natural growth rate respect the non-negative constraints, and the dynamic of 
resources’ growth respects ( 2.1 ). 
Hence, assuming continuity for the harvesting amount on the interval (0, hmax) 
given the discount factors Φ={δ(0), … , δ(t), … , δ(T)} that respect the peculiarity 
just enounced, it becomes clear that in the lifetime of the agent at any one time t, 
𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇), there is just one optimal solution for the problem of maximization that 
the agent has to face. It is evident that at time 0 the agent formulates his optimal 
harvesting strategy for his lifetime: 
 
𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇)}  ( 2.10 ) 
 
                                                 
10 With this assumption the case of pleasure in procrastination is excluded, that is when δ'(t)>0. 
11It must be noted that the absence of every time pressure or impatience implies: 
𝛿′(𝑡) = 0  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  
𝛿(𝑡)
𝛿(𝑡+1)
= 1  ∀ 𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇).  
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The optimal harvesting strategy also corresponds to the long-run best 
harvesting plan for the agent (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 2002). Besides if the agent, at 
every time, reformulates his strategy, it becomes clear and trivial that in the 
presence of time consistence, the agent does not vary his optimal strategy with the 
passage of time. But as discussed right at the beginning of this work, and as is well 
known, it implies that the discount factor must be expressed in an exponential 
manner that guarantees time consistence; 12  regarding the coherence of this 
assumption with real human behavior, much has been explained; therefore, the 
argument need not be discussed again. Therefore, as anticipated, it is assumed that 
the agent shows present-biased preferences, such that: 
 
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+1
>
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+1
      𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ   𝑡 < 𝑠   and   𝑡, 𝑠 ∈ (0, 𝑇) ( 2.11 ) 
 
This implies that the amount effectively harvested at time s, hs, will be greater 
than the amount predicted for the same period in the optimal strategy formulated at 
time t, hsopt; therefore, we have: 
 
ℎ𝑠 > ℎ𝑠
𝑜𝑝𝑡   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒   ℎ𝑠
𝑜𝑝𝑡 ∈ 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 ( 2.12 ) 
 
Therefore, we can define the implemented strategy of the biased agent Hbias strategy: 
 
𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑇)} ( 2.13 ) 
                                                 
12 We recall, also, that the agent expressed no biased preferences when 
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+𝑛
=
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+𝑛
  ∀ 𝑡 ∈
(0, 𝑇) and ∀ 𝑠 ∈ (0, 𝑇). Only when the discounting respects this condition, the agent’s evaluation of 
the optimal strategy in every period s between 0 and T conducts to the same optimal harvesting 
strategy evaluated in any period t in (0,T). 
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Hbias is derived from the instantaneous maximization at each time of the utility 
of the agent when the discount factor incorporates the present-bias peculiarities 
expressed in ( 2.11 ), under the constraints expressed earlier. Therefore, under the 
assumption of present bias at least in one period, tb, the agent harvests an amount 
greater than the optimal one in the absence of bias: ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏). 
 
2.4 The contribution of present-bias in the decrease in 
cooperation 
 
The question that is raised next is not only is it plausible an implication of 
present-bias to occur in the dynamics of the management of common resources, but 
rather if defective behaviors from the cooperative equilibrium in the management 
of common resources can be fueled and triggered by the presence of agents 
exhibiting myopic behaviors, also whether they had cooperative motivations. 
Therefore, here, the essential features in the common resources context are outlined, 
with the aim of eliciting the essential tract of defection in presence of myopic 
behavior. 
In the current model each agent encounters the same constraints that have 
been defined (growth rate, f(g, R(t)), capability constraint, hmax, and the temporal 
horizon T). Agents have cooperative preferences and follow a tit-for-tat strategy, 
implying, that having cooperative preferences, they choose in any case the 
cooperative strategy right in the first round. 
The issue here that is in question is whether the present-bias leads towards 
defective strategies in the absence of which such strategies will not occur. Therefore, 
it is not necessary to analyze the behavior of the agents that deliberately choice to 
be a free-rider from the beginning, because in such case any effect of present-bias 
is not diriment in order to trigger defective strategies, for the obvious reason that 
when free-rider intentions are present the defective strategies from the cooperative 
Cascading Defections from Cooperation Triggered by Present-Biased Behaviors in the Commons 
45 
equilibrium are a consequence of the free-rider intentions a priori with respect to 
the intertemporal bias, hence the presence of cooperative agents is assumed. 
 
2.4.1. Harvesting and fundamental behaviors 
 
In the model, each agent has two cooperative strategies: the optimal and the 
biased one. The agent does not exercise deliberative choice of one or the other 
strategy, but he can just choose between cooperating instead to free-rider (or defect 
for effect of the evaluated free-rider behavior of others, as is evident in the following 
explanation). It is not possible for a biased agent to implement the optimal strategy. 
This is a consequence of the naïve nature of a biased agent who is not conscious 
about his implementation of a biased strategy.13 
The number of the harvester, N, is common knowledge. Homogeneity is 
assumed between the N agents in the marginal utility on the harvesting.14 Therefore, 
under the hypothesis of the no-biased agents,15 for the single cooperative agent the 
optimal solution is given by the maximization of the sum of the utility of the N 
agents: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
ℎ𝑖
 ∑𝑈𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒    𝑈𝑖 = ∑𝛿𝑖(𝑡) 𝑢(ℎ𝑖(𝑡))
𝑇
𝑡=0
 ( 2.14 ) 
 
Under the constraints and conditions that we know and have expressed earlier. 
                                                 
13 It is recall that in this dissertation is assumed naïveté for the biased agents, such that naïve agents 
are fully unaware of their intertemporal inconsistency and of their future re-evaluation of the 
harvesting amounts. 
14Viceversa, now and in the following, heterogeneity is assumed in the bias factor. 
15It is important to note that the hypothesis is satisfied when: 
 
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+𝑛
=
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+𝑛
 ∀ 𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇)  ∧  ∀ 𝑠 ∈ (0, 𝑇). 
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The harvesting plan that is derived by this maximization is the cooperative 
strategy in the absence of present-bias, and this is termed optimal cooperative 
strategy: 
 
𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑐 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑐 (0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑐 (𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑐 (𝑇)} ( 2.15 ) 
 
Considering the exclusion of pleasure in procrastination, and that the present-
bias can only determine an anticipation (and never a delay) of the amount harvested, 
only if all the agents adopt the no biased cooperative strategies, the dynamics of 
harvesting could be the optimal predicted one, while in the other cases the amount 
left unharvested after each harvesting round compressively by the N agents will be 
lower.16 
It easy to understand that a lower amount left unharvested with respect to the 
prediction of the optimal cooperative strategy, is also the observable effect of the 
free-riding. In particular, a free-ride behavior at a given time t could emerge only 
when the agent harvests an amount greater than the optimal cooperative one: 
 
ℎ𝑓(𝑡) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑐 (𝑡)  ( 2.16 ) 
 
Proceeding similarly with the no biased behavior, it is understood that a 
biased cooperative agent maximizes the total amount harvested by the group of N 
agents as expressed in ( 2.14 ), when his utility function is 𝑈 =
                                                 
16 It is also specified that the distribution obtained when all the agents follow the pure cooperative 
strategy is Pareto efficient. 
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∑ 𝛿𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡) 𝑢(ℎ(𝑡))
𝑇
𝑡=0 , and δbias has the properties of deriving by ( 2.11 ), so his 
cooperative strategy, Hc={hc(0), … , hc(t), … , hc(T)}, will be the biased one, that is: 
 
𝐻𝑐 = 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
𝑐 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
𝑐 (0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
𝑐 (𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
𝑐 (𝑇)} ( 2.17 ) 
 
where for at least a given time tb we have: 
 
ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
𝑐 (𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑐 (𝑡𝑏) ( 2.18 ) 
 
Several reasons could lead the agents to defect by a perfect cooperative 
strategy. However, a pure cooperative agent can implement a strategy that does not 
coincide with Hcopt also when his aim is ‘cooperate’, because his choices can be 
affected by the limited capability of achieving the optimal solution or biased as in 
the case of present-bias. Further in the following of this work, it will be exposed the 
manner in which a movement by the optimal cooperative strategy for the effect of 
the present-bias, also in the presence of cooperative intentions, can trigger the 
dynamics of defections. 
 
2.4.2. Erroneous evaluation of a biased choice of others 
 
In a situation in which ( 2.18 ) holds, if the agents cannot be certain about the 
biased nature of the choice of others, it is not possible for a member of the group to 
distinguish if the amount that is greater that the optimal cooperative ones, hcopt(t), 
harvested by another member is derived by free-ride intentions, hf(t), or if it is a 
cooperative biased action, hcbias(t). Therefore, an excessive reduction in the stock of 
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the resource being derived by the myopia of some agent can be erroneously 
interpreted as an act of free-ride and in a tit-for-tat strategy it can trigger the 
dynamics of defection.   
In order to express the assertion proposed above it is necessary to 
preliminarily consider the situation in which the number of harvesters is only two. 
In this context, it is assumed that the agent is able to imagine and suppose that the 
other agent can be biased but without certainty regarding his intentions and he 
cannot precisely evaluate the amount, and he lacks any element in order to 
distinguish the biased agents from the free-riders. 17  Hence, heterogeneity is 
assumed in the myopic discount factor δbias(t), as defined in ( 2.11 ), hence denoting 
with i and j the agents with different levels of bias (strong present bias for the i 
agent). Therefore, as they harvest simultaneously from the same stock of 
resources,18 it is that: 
 
  
𝛿𝑖
𝑏(𝑡)
𝛿𝑖
𝑏(𝑡+1)
𝛿𝑖
𝑏(𝑠)
𝛿𝑖
𝑏(𝑠+1)
⁄   >   
𝛿𝑗
𝑏(𝑡)
𝛿𝑗
𝑏(𝑡+1)
𝛿𝑗
𝑏(𝑠)
𝛿𝑗
𝑏(𝑠+1)
⁄       𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑠 > 𝑡 ( 2.19 ) 
 
And defined: 
 
𝜌(𝑡) =
𝛿(𝑡)
𝛿(𝑡 + 1)
  ∧   𝜌(𝑠) =
𝛿(𝑠)
𝛿(𝑠 + 1)
 ( 2.20 ) 
 
For a given time s, s>t, we have: 
                                                 
17 Here the existence of the possibility that one of the two agents can be not biased is assumed, as 
well as the fact that he is able to consider the eventuality of the other agent being biased. 
18Note that the agents are homogeneous on the instantaneous harvesting utilities, ui(h)=uj(h). 
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𝜌𝑖(𝑡)
𝜌𝑖(𝑠)
>
𝜌𝑗(𝑡)
𝜌𝑗(𝑠)
 
 
( 2.21 ) 
 
We consider a situation in which 
𝛿𝑖(𝑡)
𝛿𝑖(𝑡+1)
≥
𝛿𝑗(𝑡)
𝛿𝑗(𝑡+1)
 that qualifies the context as 
that one in which agent i is not more patient than the other agent.  
From which it follows that: 
 
ℎ𝑖
𝑏(𝑡) > ℎ𝑗
𝑏(𝑡)  ( 2.22 ) 
 
Where hbi(t) and hbj(t) are respectively the amounts effectively harvested by 
the agents i and j given by the management strategies when behaviors are biased, a 
strategy that coincides with the biased cooperative ones, hci(t) and hcj(t) as expressed 
in ( 2.17 ). 
It is evident that with his harvesting, hbi(t), agent i generates negative 
externality to the agent with the lower myopic factor (or no myopic behavior), and 
this externality induces agent j to evaluate whether the damage that he receives is 
derived from free-riding. It is this evaluation, in the absence of sufficient 
information regarding the present-bias nature and magnitude of other agent that can 
lead to triggering a defective dynamic in a tit-for-tat strategy. In fact it becomes 
clear that: 
 
ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑐 (𝑡) ≤ ℎ𝑗(𝑡) < ℎ𝑖(𝑡)  ( 2.23 ) 
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Where hi(t) and hj(t) are the amounts harvested by one agent and observed by 
the other one (and which correspond respectively to the cooperative biased amounts 
hci(t) and hcj(t)), although the agents are not able to understand with certainty 
whether these amounts respond to a cooperative biased strategy or a free-rider 
amount as expressed in ( 2.16 ). In fact, what the j agent observes is that the other 
agent has a harvesting level hi(t) higher than his own cooperative level hcj(t), and 
he has no instruments in order to distinguish if the higher harvesting is derived from 
stronger myopic behaviors or by free-ride intentions. It is because agent j is unable 
to circumscribe the intentions of the other agent because the nature of the higher 
harvesting of the agent i results from a condition in which he holds 𝜌𝑖(𝑡) >
𝜌𝑖(𝑠);this implies the realization of non-consistent choices that are generated in this 
manner resulting in the impossibility to infer the intentions of the agent from the 
consistency with the possible cooperative behaviors of the past. Therefore, when 
agent j is a conditional cooperant (as in the current case), he can be induced to opt 
for a trigger strategy in the presence of hi(t)>hcj(t) also when hi(t) is equal to hbi(t) 
and it is a value that responds to a cooperative strategy, hbi(t)=hci(t). If agent j 
interprets hbi(t) as a free-rider attempt, the trigger strategy of agent j may involve 
an increase in his next harvesting level until the Nash dominant no cooperative 
amount, hj(t+1)=hmax. 
The increase in the harvesting level of agent j cannot be interpreted by agent 
i as an answer to his biased behavior, because – as assumed in this model – naïve 
agents are not normally conscious of their bias and are unable to recognize the 
appearance of their behavior as a potential free-rider behavior. In the case of naïve 
agents there is an incomplete self-knowledge regarding the biased nature of their 
behaviors. 19 Hence agent i, after observing the past behavior of the j agent, at time 
t, has predicted a given cooperative level for agent j: h*j(t+1), which does not 
coincide with hmax. When hi(t+1) is lower that hmax, the harvesting amount of the j 
                                                 
19 This is the consequence of the pure naïve nature of their behaviour, as it is assumed in this work. 
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agent is, therefore, interpreted by the i agent as a free-rider behavior attempt, that it 
is not motivated from the viewpoint of agent i because he himself has only 
cooperated till time t+1; consequently, he also can choose to start a trigger strategy. 
 
2.4.3. Triggering defective behaviors: one-by-one cascade 
defections 
 
It has been used a simplified situation with only two agents in order to make 
possible an intuitive emergence of the kind of implication that the present-bias has 
in the trigger of a not cooperative strategy. In the following pages it will be shown 
with the necessary accuracy, the dynamics of the trigger of defection choices in a 
tit-for-tat strategy with N agents that simultaneously harvest by the same stock of 
renewable resources for T periods. The features regarding the stock of resources, 
growth rate, constraints and utility functions of the agents are similar to those that 
have been used until now and therefore it is not necessary to repeat them. 
This study includes the present-biased agents which are heterogeneous in the 
myopic factor, and each agent makes his choice of harvesting with reference to a 
given period at the beginning of the same; at the end of each period, and prior to 
the beginning of the following one, each agent can observe the amount harvested 
by the other agents. 
In every period t each agent is capable of doing a cardinal order of all the 
amounts harvested, in such a manner that it is identifies with h1(t) the amount 
harvested by the agent that harvests less, and in an increasing order until hN(t), 
where agent N is the one who harvests more. Therefore, we have the following order: 
 
𝐴ℎ = {ℎ1(𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑛(𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑁(𝑡)}  ( 2.24 ) 
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Where each n agent is able to distinguish the n-1 agents that have harvested 
less than him from the N-n agents that have harvested more. 
At every round each agent is expected to make a new decision regarding the 
amount that he is going to take. At the beginning of every period each agent 
observes the amount harvested by the others in the harvesting round just antecedent 
and the amount still present in the common stock, which is the only information 
made available to the agents. Next each agent decides whether to implement the 
cooperative or defective strategy. In the first case the cooperative amount harvested 
will be given by the maximization at time t of ( 2.14 ), under the usual constraints, 
for the period of the residual lifetime (t,T). Otherwise, the defection strategy 
consists of the adoption of the dominant Nash strategy, that implies a harvest of hmax, 
until the culmination of the interactions. 
 
With the objective of limiting only the effect of the present bias in the trigger 
of a defective strategy this study considers the extreme case in which all the N 
agents are cooperative agents. But their cooperative intentions are not common 
knowledge; the only information that each agent has on the others is only the 
amount harvested. Furthermore, the agents, of course, are not conscious of their 
own present bias. 
Each agent has a predicted probability pn(f) of the free-rider nature of others; 
as it is based only upon his personal belief regarding the number of free-riders 
present in the group, between all others agents, N-1, such that he assigns at each 
other agent the same probability to be free-rider, so: 
 
𝑝𝑛(𝑓) =
𝐹𝑛
𝑁 − 1
 
 
( 2.25 ) 
Where Fn is the number of free-riders present in the group estimated by the 
agent n. 
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The estimation is only subjective, and is formulated by the agent in a 
condition of lack of information, and thus it is not assumed that this estimation is 
equal for all the agents.20 Due to the total lack of information, the agent constructs 
his personal beliefs regarding the presence of free-riders and the related probability 
through an action of mental accounting where he infers a probability in the actual 
context based on his past experience in others contexts (Gigerenzer, et al., 1991). It 
is an inductive inference from the subjective long-term memory of the agent, that 
is abstract and different from the real present context. The logical induction begins 
by his general long-term memory that suggests that free-riders exist and that within 
this context free-riding is possible and leads them to utilize this understanding in 
the task of solving the problem, assuming so a strictly positive probability of the 
presence of free-riders within the group. Hence, we have also that: 
 
𝑝𝑛(𝑓) > 0  ∀ 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁  ( 2.26 ) 
 
The representative agent of the model is a conditional cooperant and his 
strategy is a tit-for-tat one that prescribes that he starts harvesting a cooperative 
amount, hcn(t), continuing to harvest the cooperative amount as long as he believes 
that the other agents are also cooperating. The strategy instead prescribes the 
defection when the agent’s belief leads him to believe that at least one agent with 
free-rider intentions has caused him some damage with an amount harvested that is 
greater than his own hcn(t); in this case the agent starts to harvest the non-
cooperative amount, hmax, until the end of the interactions. 
                                                 
20 This is mentioned because this occurs in a context where each agent is subjected to the complete 
lack of information regarding the real intentions of others; hence, the estimated presence of a free-
rider is not related to the real presence.  
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At each period t the agent n observes the harvesting order, and at time t+1 he 
will select the defective strategy when a damage occurs and there is a given 
probability that among the agents who create the damage there is at least one free-
rider; this probability, Pn(F≥1), needs in order to determine a defective choice, to 
be a value at least big enough for the agent to evaluate as sufficient to the defection, 
Pdn(F≥1). 
Therefore, assuming that s is a period within (0, T), the agent defects after 
time s when the following holds true: 
 
𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1)𝑠 ≥ 𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1) ( 2.27 ) 
 
Where Pn(F≥1)s, is the probability condition estimated at time s. Hence, it is 
clear that the harvesting strategy of agent n will be as follows: 
 
ℎ𝑛(𝑡) = {
ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑡) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 ≤ 𝑠
ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 > 𝑠
   𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ   𝑡 ∧ 𝑠 ∈ (0, 𝑇) ( 2.28 ) 
 
Regarding the conditions of defection, the condition of damaging harvesting 
occurs when a member of the group on N harvester, takes an amount greater than 
the cooperative one of agent n, that is: 
 
ℎ𝑗(𝑡) > ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑡)  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ( 2.29 ) 
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The observations of the amounts harvested enable the agent to circumscribe 
the N-n agents that determine a damage. Among these, the agent n evaluates the 
presence of the free-riders, in order to verify the realization of the condition ( 2.27 ). 
Therefore, defining as: 
 
𝛺 = {1, . . . , 𝑛, . . . , 𝑁|1, . . . , 𝑁 = 𝑓, 𝑐} ( 2.30 ) 
 
the set of all the possible compositions of the group on N agents where each 
agent can be a free-rider, f, or a cooperant, c. The number of the possible cases can 
be given by the ordered selections of N-n subject in Ω, with the exclusion of himself, 
hence by (
𝑁 − 1
𝑁 − 𝑛
). 
The probability, that occurs a situation where among the N-n agents there is 
at least one free-rider, is given by the ratio between the favorable cases and the 
possible ones. The favorable cases are all those in which between the N-n agents of 
the upper sub-group, the number of potentially free-rider are between 1 and Fn. 
Defined the probability of presence of a given number of free-rider, q, inside 
subgroup N-n as: 
 
𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑞) =
 
𝐹𝑛!
𝑞!(𝐹𝑛−𝑞)!
(𝑁−1−𝐹𝑛)!
(𝑁−𝑛−𝑞)!(𝑛+𝑞−1−𝐹𝑛)!
(𝑁−1)!
(𝑁−𝑛)!(𝑛−1)!
 ( 2.31 ) 
 
where the probability for each agent, about the event (f,c), is true f, is given 
by the subjective estimation of the agent n, pn(f), as derived by ( 2.25 ). 
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Therefore, we have: 
𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1) =   ∑ 𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑞)
𝐹𝑛
𝑞=1
 ( 2.32 ) 
where F is the number of free-riders. Remembering that P(F=q)=0 when 
n<Fn+1- q. 
 
  
The defection choice, that is derived from ( 2.28 ), occurs if there is the 
probability of the presence of at least one free-rider, Pn(F≥1), and it is more or 
equal to Pdn(F≥1). 
Considering the value of Pdn(F≥1) it is assumed that for a probability of the 
presence of at least one free-rider between the N-n agent that harvests more, that is 
approximated to the certitude, that is Pn(F≥1)≈1, each agent n chooses for sure 
the no cooperative harvesting. Such that having Pdn(F≥1) ≤ 1 ∀ n ∊ N, it will be: 
 
ℎ𝑛(𝑡) = ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝑃𝑛(𝐹 ≥ 1) ≈ 1   ∀  𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 ( 2.33 ) 
 
Now it is considered an order that includes all the N agents, where each n 
agent has the position within this order equal to the position that his harvesting hn 
has in the order defined in ( 2.24 ). Therefore, we have a cardinal order which 
identifies with n=1 the agent who has harvested less and therefore increasingly until 
agent N that has harvested more than all the others. Hence: 
𝐴 = {1, . . . , 𝑛, . . . , 𝑁}  ( 2.34 ) 
Cascading Defections from Cooperation Triggered by Present-Biased Behaviors in the Commons 
57 
Each agent estimates a probability of the presence of a free-rider among the 
N-n agents that have harvested more than himself, Pn(F≥1), as defined in ( 2.32 ). 
It is thus becomes easy to understand that for n which approaches to 1 in the 
order defined in ( 2.34 ) we have Pn(F≥1)≈1. This implies that at least the agent 
that has the first place, n=1, in the order A at time t, will decide to defect, starting 
by period t+1. 
Therefore, keeping in mind the ( 2.33 ), at each period t after time 0 it will be 
observed that at least one agent chooses a defective harvesting amount that is equal 
to hmax from t+1 until T. In fact, at every time t+1 the defection of an agent that at 
time t was in the condition Pn(F≥1)t≥Pdn(F≥1) determines a new order where at 
least one agent, that at time t+1 had harvested the cooperative amount hc(t+1), 
evaluates a Pn(F≥1)t+1 sufficient for the defection at time t+2. This is because at 
every period there is a new agent in the first place in the order A such that Pn(F≥
1)≈1; hence ( 2.27 ) holds true. Therefore, in the following period he will shift 
from the cooperative strategy to the defective one. It is this process that is auto-
fueling time after time, and leads, for a sufficiently large time of interaction T, to 
the disappearance of the cooperative actions within the group. 
 
 
2.5 Condition for a cascade of defections 
 
It is evident, in this discussion, that within a context populated by conditional 
cooperators with a heterogeneous myopic discount factor, in the absence of 
institutions of coordination coupled with the lack of information, the present-biased 
preferences can lead to the application of a triggered strategy that directs the 
community to excessively increase their harvesting level, also if their other-
regarding motives were cooperatives. Therefore, the drop in the cooperative 
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instances can also be the effect of the absence of institutional instruments for 
improvement of coordination in the face of the cognitive bias that affects human 
behaviors. In particular, this work has revealed it assuming blindness and no-
awareness of the bias of others and absence of any type of tolerance for the presence 
of free-riders.21 But the conditions, under which present-bias triggers a defections 
cascade, are wider and less restrictive and these conditions will be defined here. 
Specifically, the conditions regarding the two decisive decision-making elements 
of the defection will be defined: the critical value of the presence of possible free-
riders estimated by the agent – this implies that there is a critical level of free-riders 
that damage the agent to a degree that from this level the agent will not be available 
to cooperate any further, and consequently the defection starts when the estimated 
probability of the number of free-riders that exceed the critical level is considered 
sufficiently high by the agent in order to defect  – and, the second element that leads 
to the defection, is the definition of the behavioral strategy implemented in the set 
of interactions over time. 
 
2.5.1. Condition regarding the critical value in order to defect 
 
Only on rare occasions do agents behave under conditions of certainty; even 
in the context of this study the implementation of a defection strategy occured only 
for a probability of the presence of free-riders close to the certitude, which makes 
it too restrictive to be well-fitting to reality. However, we can easily assume also 
that the choice of the agent depends on the no-cooperative amount also for 
estimations of the presence of free-riders less than one, without any change in the 
conclusion drawn in the one-to-one defection cascade mentioned earlier. In fact, 
                                                 
21 𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1) accurately expresses this absence of tolerance because it stated that the presence of 
just one free-rider (or the belief that there is a free-rider also as a consequence of an erroneous 
evaluation) is sufficient to trigger the defection. 
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concerning the probability value, Pnd, it is sufficient to assume that it is positive:22 
 
0 < 𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝐹 ≥ 1) ≤ 1       ∀  𝑛 ∈ (1, 𝑁) ( 2.35 ) 
 
Furthermore, we can also consider that the agent can understand that the 
evaluation of the presence of only one free-rider is inadequate to start a trigger 
strategy, but he may need, in order to choose the no-cooperative amount until the 
end of the interactions, more than one free-rider among the N-n agents who harvest 
more than himself. In this case, agent n is willing to accept the presence of a 
physiological number of free-riders, qn. 
We can also extend the nature of this physiological number of free-riders also 
inclusive of those who erroneously behave as free-riders. This implies that the agent 
accepts the presence of a given number of agents within his group of harvesting 
who behave in a manner compatible with free-rider intentions. This extension opens 
up the opportunity of introducing heterogeneity within the model, in particular, 
making it possible to have both the pure naïve agent that the agent is conscious of 
the possibility of an erroneous implementation of a free-ride harvested amount;23 
for naïve agents qn represents merely the acceptable number of free-riders within 
the group, whereas for the second one represents the acceptable number of 
individuals that behave compatibly with free-ride intentions.24 
                                                 
22 It is clear that if the defection occurs for a probability of the presence of a free-rider lower that 
one, the result is the same as that obtained when the defection begins just in presence to the certitude, 
but with Pnd lower than one (but positive) the possibility exists that the defection condition is 
verified for more than one agent for round. 
23 It is assumed that the pure naïve agent has no capacity to understand that his behavior is biased 
and at the same time he cannot recognize that the behavior of other can be a reaction to his biased 
behavior.  
24 For the simplicity of narration, for both kinds of agents, qn refers to the physiological number of 
free-riders within the group (without specifying the peculiarity of the case of the no-full naïve 
agents). 
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Hence, with Pn(F>qn) is defined the probability estimated by agent n 
regarding the presence of a number of free-riders greater than the physiological one 
among the N-n who with their higher harvesting cause harm to agent n, and hence 
is greater than the acceptable one. In particular, we have: 
 
𝑃𝑛(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛) = ∑ 𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑞)
𝐹𝑛
𝑞=𝑞𝑛+1
 ( 2.36 ) 
 
And the conditions necessary for the defective choice are as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑛(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛)𝑠 ≥ 𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛)    𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑞𝑛 < 𝐹𝑛 ( 2.37 ) 
 
Where Pn(F>qn)s is the probability evaluated at time s in (0,T), and the set 
choices are still defined by ( 2.28 ). This implies that the agent stops cooperating 
when the estimated number of agents that harvest a compatible free-rider amount 
exceeding the physiological one. 
The only condition that is set is for qn to be lower than Fn, that is the conditio 
sine qua non in order to have a conditional cooperant. In fact, if theoretically the 
agent takes the non-cooperative amount only after qn is greater than Fn, it means 
that he is willing to defect for an evaluated presence of free-riders between the N-n 
agents that cause him damage greater than the number that he himself has assumed 
to be present in the group of N agents. This is not a real possibility of defecting. In 
this case the behavior is similar to the behavior of an unconditional cooperant, that 
a priori and independently by the other element, chooses always the cooperative 
amount. 
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By observing ( 2.36 ), it is evident also that when we assume qn>1 we have: 
 
𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑛→1
 𝑃𝑛⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  (𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛) = 1  ( 2.38 ) 
 
Therefore, if each agent estimates a positive pn(f) and each agent defects for 
the probability of an excessive number of free-riders that is 0<Pdn(F>qn)≤1 with 
qn< Fn, and the strategy set is the one expressed in ( 2.28 ),25 with at least one agent 
for every period, there is a decrease in the cooperative behaviors with the passing 
of the interactions, and this decrease depends not on the real presence of an 
excessive number of free-riders but by the impossibility to distinguish the free-rider 
attempts from the cooperative but present-bias choices. 
 
2.5.2. Conditions for the harvesting strategy 
 
Until now, we have considered as the possible set strategy only the one that 
prescribe, to defective choices, the non-cooperative dominant strategy, hn=hmax; 
now it is necessary to take into account a wider range of defective choices. Hence 
it will be shown that when an agent adopts a tit-for-tat strategy, it is possible to 
result in a cascade of defections, also if the defective choice is different from the 
non-cooperative dominant ones.  
In fact, the agent can also not exactly adopt the no-cooperative dominant 
choice but it is sufficient that when the condition given by ( 2.37 ) occurs, the agent 
increases his harvesting of an amount arbitrarily greater than those of the precedent 
                                                 
25The set of strategies that leads to a cascade defection when ( 2.26 ), ( 2.35 ) and ( 2.37 ) hold is 
wider, and does not require the strict adoption of the Nash dominant harvesting, as evident in the 
following.  
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period; and that the new amount also guarantees a harvesting greater than the 
cooperative amount. If after the increase the condition given by ( 2.37 ) does not 
hold true anymore, the agent maintains a harvesting amount not lower than the last 
one, hn(t-1), provided that this amount is greater that the cooperative one for period 
t, in order to maintain the non-cooperative behavior. Otherwise, he will harvest an 
amount arbitrarily greater than the cooperative one, in order to maintain the decision 
to stop to cooperate after that ( 2.37 ) it is verified the first time, and the increase in 
the harvesting occurs each time that this condition is verified in order to avoid the 
permanence of the damaging situation. 
 
Therefore, we can define the strategy set of the agent as follows: 
 
ℎ𝑛(𝑡) = {
ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑡)
ℎ𝑛(𝑡 − 1) + 𝜖𝑛(𝑡)
𝑚𝑎𝑥{ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑡) + 𝜖𝑛(𝑡), ℎ𝑛(𝑡 − 1)}
𝑡 ≤ 𝑠𝑚
𝑡 > 𝑠𝑚 ∨  𝑡 = 𝑠 + 1 ∧ ℎ𝑛(𝑡 − 1) > ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑡)
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ   𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇), 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑠𝑚 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑆), 𝑆 ⊆ (0, 𝑇)
 ( 2.39 ) 
Where the arbitrary increase as the strictly positive amount just sufficient in order 
to have ℎ𝑛(𝑡) > ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (t) and ℎ𝑛(𝑡) > ℎ𝑛(𝑡 − 1)  is defined as: 
 
𝜖𝑛(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑡, ℎ𝑛(𝑡)) > 0 ( 2.40 ) 
 
and 
 
∃ 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 ⊆ (0, 𝑇) ⇔ 𝐴𝑠: 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛)𝑠 ≥ 𝑃𝑛
𝑑(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛) ( 2.41 ) 
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where As is the order as in ( 2.34 ) defined at time s; and {S} is the order set 
of all the periods in which the ( 2.37 ) holds true, which includes all the periods in 
which the probability of the presence of a number of free-riders greater than the 
maximum acceptable qn, is equal or greater than the sufficient probability for the 
defective choice, Pdn(F>qn). Regarding this it is already revealed that ( 2.41 ) holds 
true at least for one agent at each period when Pn(f)>0, 0<pdn(F>0)≤1 and qn< Fn. 
Therefore, assuming the strategy set ( 2.39 ), that includes not only the 
dominant Nash strategies but all the amounts that respond to a defective intention 
of the agent, for all the agents within the group of N, and defining an order as in 
( 2.34 ); we have that for every order At in (0,T), given ( 2.35 ) and ( 2.26 ), at least 
for the agent in the first position of the order the probability of the presence of an 
excessive number of free-riders approaches to the certitude. Hence we obtain that: 
 
∀𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇) ∃ 𝐴𝑡 |  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑛 → 1  𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝑃𝑛(𝐹 > 𝑞𝑛) = 1 ( 2.42 ) 
 
Therefore, the ( 2.41 ) and ( 2.42 ) together imply that in every period at least 
for an agent the sufficient conditions in order to increase the harvesting amount in 
the next period, that guarantees non-cooperative choices, are satisfied, that is: 
 
∀ 𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇) ∃ 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 ∶  𝑡 = 𝑠 ( 2.43 ) 
 
From which: 
 
∀𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇) ∃ 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 ∶  ℎ𝑛(𝑡 + 1) > ℎ𝑛(𝑡)  ∧   ℎ𝑛(𝑡 + 1) > ℎ𝑛
𝑐 (𝑡 + 1) ( 2.44 ) 
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It is thus very clear that during each period some agent increases his 
harvesting, moving away from the cooperative behavior. This implies a tendency 
over time to change the order of the agents derived from their harvesting level, with 
a translation of the already defective agents to a higher position in the order; in this 
way, the one who is still cooperative takes his place on the lower-side positions 
observing the increase in, time-by-time, the probability that implies defective 
choices. This phenomenon determines the increase in the agents that defect by their 
cooperative behavior over time. 
In fact, assuming the condition revealed in the model, it is given a context 
that for his peculiarities has always at least one agent in the stage of increasing his 
harvesting over the cooperative level. Therefore, with the passage of interactions, 
the cooperative agents decrease inducing others agents to defect. Agents defect due 
to their lower harvesting and the increasing in the value of the probability as 
expressed in ( 2.36 ) until the level in which the condition expressed in ( 2.37 ) is 
verified. It is very logical and easy to understand that the consequence of the 
dynamics exposed is a progressive decay of the cooperative behaviors within the 
group. Therefore, the existence of the dynamics of defection, which is also seen in 
presence of the cooperative and prosocial preferences, can be explicated as the 
dynamics triggered by the presence of present-biased behaviors, when whoever 
observes just the amount harvested cannot distinguish the biased choices from the 
free-rider attempts. In this case the decadence of cooperation in the management of 
commons could be mitigated by adopting instruments designed to oppose to the 
effect of present-bias, qualifying the agent’s choices not only in function of their 
harvesting but also in relation to their social preferences and intentions. 
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2.6 Conclusion and final remarks 
 
This investigation regarding the effect of present-bias on the management of 
common resources has been conducted in the first instance because without the 
peculiarity of the present-biased agent there is a reduction in the cognitive 
dimension of the human decision-making that presents a distorted representation of 
the question that concerns the harvesting by common resources. Therefore, it has 
been demonstrated that when the agents are conditional cooperators, the presence 
of the myopic factor, in the absence of appropriate information or institutions that 
facilitate the coordination, can trigger the dynamics of defections by the cooperative 
strategy. Besides this work has defined the conditions in which, also in the face of 
the existence of cooperative preferences of agents, without self-awareness to be 
biased and correction and in the impossibility of know their real intentions, present 
biased behaviors trigger a cascade of defections where the number of individuals 
that choose to stop to cooperate growth and growth over time. Therefore, it is 
revealed that if the agents estimate the presence of free-riders within the group of 
harvesters using their long-term memory, in the absence of sufficient and well 
defined information regarding the effective number of free-riders present within the 
group, the implementation of defective strategies is generated by the 
misunderstanding regarding the real intention of the present biased agents. 
Thus when agents can behave conformably to their biased preferences, 
without an instrument of coordination and sustain to the existent desire of 
cooperation, they direct to a suboptimal allocation over time the amount harvested 
damaging themselves and the others. 
From the theoretical point of view, the model presented responds to the idea 
that a true representation of human behavior in the social intertemporal dilemmas 
requires an inclusion of the complexity in the decision-making process, in particular, 
of the cognitive factors that affect the choices. At the same time, it is not possible 
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to ignore the social dimension of the human nature when the argument of discussion 
is characterized for common properties. 
In fact, on the one hand, the adoption of sustainable and cooperative behavior 
in relevant social dilemmas depends on the degree of consciousness regarding the 
effect of their own behaviors on others showing interest and care for the common 
resources. This propensity finds form in the cooperative and other-regarding 
motives. On the other hand, the choices made reflect the capability of reading and 
weighing correctly the costs and the benefits that are derived from their own choices 
and decisions. The intertemporal decision-making processes, that direct the choices, 
are also the path by which the social dilemmas are solved by individuals. It is within 
this process also that the social preferences find realization. 
It thus becomes very clear that the cognitive aspects and the behavioral traits 
of the intertemporal choices, such as present-bias, are fundamental elements that 
offer a representation of social dilemmas. The analysis of cognitive biases in the 
intertemporal dynamics of cooperation and interrelation between individuals is 
crucial in order to obtain a full understanding of the dynamics of harvesting (and 
overharvesting) from the commons, and this understanding is essential to define 
and create suitable instruments that can sustain cooperative preferences. 
Therefore, this paper has shown that when the agents adopt certain kinds of 
behaviors and strategies, in particular when they are conditional cooperators, who 
evaluate the presence of a positive number of free-riders within the group in the 
face of the absence of information on the nature of the other group members, the 
presence of naïve agents who behave conformably to biased preference with 
restricted self-knowledge regarding their own biases, can by itself triggers a cascade 
of defection similar to those observed in the controlled experiments. 
It is also the opinion of who writes, in the light of the results obtained by this 
work, that the cognitive factors that affect the intertemporal ability of the agents are 
greatly involved in the decadence of cooperative interaction over time. Otherwise, 
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this is merely a part of the complexity of human decisions, where the causes of a 
given behavior interact among them. Present-bias is one piece of the puzzle that 
together with the free-ride opportunity explicates the phenomena observed. 
In fact, regarding the dynamics of the cascade of defective choices, the 
rapidity in the diffusion depends upon several factors. In particular, the presence of 
heterogeneity in the intentions can contribute to a new complexity to the dynamics, 
but the presence of free-riders, as well as of biased agents, can only be an additional 
factor in the abandonment of cooperative behaviors, with an increase in the rapidity. 
Of course, decay in the cooperative intentions can also occur independently of the 
present-bias if the real free-riders are present in an excessive quantity per se. 
Although, these elements affect the rapidity and complexity of the defective cascade, 
however it was not objective of this work to define this speed. Instead, the claim 
was, as has been done, to show that the observable and observed decay of the 
cooperative choices in the common resources dilemmas are not a unique and 
unequivocal signal of an increase in the free-riding intentions, but can also result 
from present biased preferences and myopic behaviors of the cooperative agents. In 
conclusion, this work shows that within a context populated by conditional 
cooperators with a heterogeneous myopic discount factor, in the absence of the 
institution of coordination and in the face of lack of information, the present biased 
preferences can lead to the application of a trigger strategy that can direct the 
community to excessively increase their harvesting level also, if their other-
regarding motives were cooperatives. Therefore, a decrease in the cooperative 
intentions can also be the effect of the absence of coordination instruments in the 
face of the cognitive bias that affects human behaviors. 
These conclusions are relevant and useful for the policy whose goal is to 
support the cooperative and sustainable behaviors in the management of the 
common resources. In fact, sustaining the diffusion of the prosocial preferences, 
while being an essential prerequisite for the diffusion of cooperation on the 
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commons, cannot offer the result desired if the individuals and the community lack 
the necessary instrument for wise management of the resources in the face of the 
risk connected to present-bias.  
Human behavior follows complex dynamic and decision-making processes, 
where the cognitive dimension plays a crucial role, and present-bias is one of the 
elements that, moving far from the pure rational behavior, increases the complexity 
of the human interaction in the commons. For these reasons the interrelation of this 
cognitive element with the social dimension of human nature requires further study 
and it should be included in the model where the intertemporal dimension of the 
choosing meets the collective and social dimensions that characterize the 
management of the resources.    
Three Essays in Behavioral Economics that Investigate the Effects of Present Bias in the Management of 
Renewable Resources 
Chapter 3 : Following Spontaneous Other-
regarding Preferences or Adopting Social 
Norms in the Intergenerational Transfer in 
Renewable Resources Dilemmas when Agents 
Are Present-Biased. 
 
The paper analyses the effects of the present-bias in terms of reduction of the 
welfare of future generations in the framework of renewable resources harvesting. 
In particular, this study queries the behavior traits that may emerge when the agent 
is present-biased and also in the presence of other-regarding preferences toward 
future generations, which are expressed through adherence to genuine other-
regarding forms of behavior or specific social norms.  
This investigation demonstrates that the strategic short-sightedness imposed 
by the “dictatorship of the present” causes a reduction in the well-being of future 
generations, despite the existence of strong social preferences. Faced with this 
problem, this study argues that if the social preferences of the individuals are not 
left only and exclusively to their own spontaneous behavior, and if these social 
preferences are interpolated by social norms charged with representing the 
individual's social preferences, a mitigation of the effect of present bias on the 
intergenerational equity can occur. 
  
Following Spontaneous Other-Regarding Preferences or Adopting Social Norms in the Intergenerational 
Transfer in Renewable Resources Dilemmas when Agents Are Present-Biased. 
70 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Questioning the use of resources designated for multiple generations means, 
in the first instance, questioning, in the intertemporal management of resources, the 
crucial role played by discounting, which is operated by agents who manage the 
resources. The discount rate applied to the intertemporal management of renewable 
resources involves several orders of problems, and as this study will discuss, one of 
these is the possibility that the discount rate does not respond to the principle of 
time consistency because it can be a no-constant. A time inconsistency situation 
implies that an optimal choice defined at the present could be revisited in the future 
(Strotz, 1956). The origin of this phenomenon is the present bias that determines 
the emergence of preference reversals that generate a conflict between the long-run 
preferences and immediate choices. Therefore, when the task involves making of 
intertemporal decisions, the absence of a constant discount factor determines for 
individuals the condition of possible revaluation of the harvesting, changing it from 
the value estimated before. This behavior in the context of management of resources 
induces people to change their harvesting path. In fact, one of the elements that is 
strictly related to the present bias is precisely the preference-reversal behavior, 
which can change the outcome of the other-regarding choices posed at the 
beginning by the agent, who has to leave some part of resources for future 
generations. The presence of preference reversals is consistent with agents who 
show a diminishing impatience, such that, the future is discounted with a declining 
discount rate (Hepburn, et al., 2010). 
 
In the last few years some studies have started to explore the applications of 
the no-constant discount rate in resources management (Settle & Shogren, 2004) 
and in contexts related to the environment (Brekke & Jhoansson-Stenman, 2008; 
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Karp, 2005) starting to show the dichotomy that intervenes between the present-
biased agents and the rational ones (Winkler, 2006; Hepburn, et al., 2010). 
However, as Gsottbauer and van den Bergh (2011) remark, the studies that 
investigate no-constant discounting in resources management have excluded from 
their analysis the other-regarding preferences. The assertion is well-founded; in fact, 
to analyze the impact of present-bias on agents’ behaviors by excluding the agent’s 
regarding for the others, limits the analysis of the real peculiarities of people. In 
fact, other-regarding preferences are found in everyday life, with the evidence that 
the individuals have ‘carefulness concepts’ such as fairness (Gintis, 2000), when 
adopting pro-social behaviors in a wide range of situations (Meier & Stutzer, 2008; 
Frey & Meier, 2004; Alpizar, et al., 2008) and in different cultures (Henrich, et al., 
2004). Furthermore, in literature there are several robust studies that show the 
validity and the reasons for an inclusion of the other-regarding motives in the study 
of the economics behaviors (Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Gachter, 2007; Gintis, et al., 
2005; Fehr & Gachter, 2002). For these reasons, if the purpose is to investigate the 
effects of present-bias in resource management when the resources are designated 
for the use of multiple generations, the analysis of the impact that myopic behaviors 
have on the transfer of resources from one generation to the next need to be 
conducted, taking care of the other-regarding motives of the individual. 
In fact, it is known that many contexts related to social dilemmas, in particular 
the use of resources, assume for their intrinsic nature, an intergenerational 
dimension; referring to these applications, it is evident that the externalities derived 
from the behavior of a single agent within a more or less large community, often 
generate effects not only on other members of the community that take their actions 
at the same time, but frequently, negative externalities can affect future generations 
of the community, whose welfare depends on the level of impoverishment to which 
the resources were previously subjected.  
Hence, taking into account the presence of intertemporal externalities that 
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affect the dynamics of intergenerational interaction in social dilemmas, it has 
become clear why to explore a path of a research that questions the behavior that 
individuals adopt in a context that assumes a peculiar dynamic that involves several 
generations. 
In fact, when the resource management suffers any risk in connection with 
the present bias, it is necessary to understand in what manner present-biased 
behaviors affect the intertemporal dynamic in relation to the intergenerational 
preferences of a naïve agent, who has social preferences for his successors, taking 
care that the social preferences of individuals can be expressed with the spontaneous 
choices taken and also with the compliance to the specific social norms that the 
community defines. In fact, the capability of human society to define social and 
behavioral norms is one of the elements that characterize the sociability that put 
individuals in relationships with one another and determines their interdependence 
on one another for their welfare. In fact, the problem also involves the matching of 
behaviors adopted with respect the social preferences expressed by a community or 
an individual. For these reasons it is important to try to understand in what manner 
present-biased behaviors in the intertemporal management of resources affect the 
other-regarding preferences outcomes in the intergenerational framework. 
 
3.2. Intertemporal myopia in resource management 
 
Analyzing the intertemporal myopia in resource management primarily 
involves questioning of the effect of ‘no-constant intertemporal discounting’ in the 
allocation of the amount harvested over time. The no-constant discount generates 
an intertemporal inconsistency in the agent’s choices over time. The inconsistency 
depends on the application of a higher discount rate over the short time and a lower 
discount rate over the distant one. This effect has theoretical and experimental 
foundations (Laibson, 1997) and when present bias is so indicated, the behavior that 
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is under the influence of the immediate reward brings about the application of two 
different discount rates between short-run and long-run benefits. This fact can be 
the based on the difficulties that can emerge in the management of resources when 
agents are called to define intertemporal harvesting. In fact, the intertemporal 
management of resources, with its own intrinsic peculiarities in the intertemporal 
dynamic, is not an easy task for the individuals who also show important decisional 
myopia (Pevnitskaya & Ryvkin, 2010). It is the time dependence of the discount 
rate, particularly, that implies preference reversals and generates a conflict between 
long-run preferences and immediate choices, which consequently leads to the 
existence of a conflict between the early intention of the agent and the choice made 
at the present.  
Behaviors that contradict time-consistence assumption are widely studied and 
underlined (Loewenstein & Pralec, 1992; Frederick, et al., 2002). The systematic 
tendency of a greater discount in the near future rather than in the distant one is a 
consequence of people’s impulsivity (Loewenstein & Pralec, 1992) that under the 
pressure of the moment will take the short-run benefit ignoring of the long-run 
impact. Furthermore, intertemporal choices do not find a well-fitted representation 
in the exponential discount factor (Laibson, 1997), with the consequence that 
people make short-sighted decisions where cost and benefit are involved over time. 
These kinds of behaviors are interpreted as being due to a lack of self-control or 
present-bias preferences (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999; Laibson, 1997). 
For this reason, in recent times, more studies have started to pose questions 
about the implication of this bias in all the fields that involve the intertemporal 
dimension of human decision-making. Therefore, the effects of present bias have 
been investigated in several areas: Low saving rate (Ashraf, et al., 2006; Harris & 
Laibon, 2001; Laibson, 1997; Laibson, et al., 1998), health context (Pol & Cairns, 
2002), drugs, smoking or buying addictions (Gruber & Koszegi, 2001; Thaler & 
Shefrin, 1981; Wertenbroch, 1998; Frederick, et al., 2002), and behaviors of 
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procrastination (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999; Bernabou & Tirole, 2003). 
As the areas just mentioned, resource management too, by its nature, is 
characterized as an area where present bias has a great potential impact. In fact, the 
risks associated with preference reversals and the “dictatorship of the present” 
increase in settings where long-term interests may conflict with a wish for 
immediate consumption. This conflict can typically emerge in all the fields of public 
and common goods — for instance, in public goods this is underlined in Winkler 
(2006)— and this conflict strongly characterizes renewable resource management. 
The extraction of natural resources, in fact, is characterized as a typical area where 
such risks exist and the possible consequences in terms of excessive resource 
depletion are a real risk, where decisions do not comply with the principles of 
temporal consistency, potentially ushering in resource-collapse conditions. It is 
specifically shown that if the no-constant discount rate is applied to the 
management of a stock of natural resources in absence of the capability to commit 
to the policy implemented, the possibility of revaluating the plan by the governance 
planner will lead to a collapse of the resources (Hepburn, et al., 2010). Also Settle 
and Shogren (2004), show that a no-constant discount affects the optimal resource 
management decision and that the main issue is the time inconsistency of the 
policies implicated, as the no-constant discount rate supports the possibility of 
justifying a change in the decisions of the policy makers in the future. 
Therefore, in the context of a typical present-bias risk in intergenerational 
management, the optimal resource stock management could be compromised; 
including the possibility that the well-being — which is also the well-being of future 
generations — would be jeopardized by the excessive weight of the present, arising 
from a higher discount rate in the short-term due to the present bias. 
However, when the query involves issues about renewable resources from the 
intergenerational prospective, the discussion is not limited merely to the 
impoverishment of the stock of resources for effect of the allocation of the 
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harvesting amount over time by the present generation for their own consumption 
preferences. In fact, nevertheless, the issue involves also the social dimension in 
relation to the intergenerational equity and the welfare of future generations — 
elements that for the present generation also represent specific social preferences. 
In fact, as it will be discussed in the next paragraph (offering a short presentation 
of the other-regarding preferences), the individuals have social preferences, such 
that they assign a positive value to the welfare of the future generations. Therefore, 
the present generation also includes inside its decisional process the welfare of the 
future generation, when the task is to define the allocation of the consumption over 
time. In this manner, the present generation has the aim of behaving in accordance 
with its own social preferences, exteriorized with a given amount of resources, to 
predetermine the consumption of the following generations. As long as the 
intertemporal choices of the individual are time-consistent, it is clear that the 
outcome of the decision taken also responds to the social preferences of the 
individual himself. However, in the absence of time-consistency, when the agent 
behaves myopically under the effect of the present bias, the coherence between 
improved action and early intention of the individual can fade away. Therefore, the 
welfare of the future generation has no guarantee of a harvesting plan that is time-
consistent. For this reason, this study queries the behavior traits that may emerge 
when the agent is present-biased and also in the presence of social preferences 
toward future generations, which are expressed through adherence to genuine other-
regarding forms of behavior or specific social norms.  
 
3.3. A retrospective on other-regarding motives 
 
In a common resource dilemma, as it is well known, the economic theory 
prescribes the overexploitation of resources, synthesized by the famous expression 
“tragedy of the common” used by Hardin (1968). This phenomenon depends on the 
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benefit that derives from an extra unit of consumption of the common resources 
when the cost of the reduction of the stock of commons is divided between all the 
members of the community that use it and not only between those who consume 
the extra units. Therefore, the agents who take their decision in conformity with the 
exclusive interest for their own wealth without a care for the consequences on the 
wealth of others, helps in the overexploitation of the stock of resources. The 
traditional economic theory prescripts and predicts these kinds of behaviors because 
the assumptions on the economic behavior of the agents are built on the axiom of 
self-interest. The axiom of self-interest is a behavioral assumption that is declined 
in function of a coherent adhesion to the three logical processes that lead the way 
to the thinking and operating of a homo oeconomicus: Self-centered welfare, self-
welfare goal, and self-goal choice (Sen, 1985) — building in this way a theoretical 
system of economic interactions composed of exclusive selfish agents. However, 
when we are faced with events that we see daily and also in the reality of human 
interactions, this axiomatic construction does not appear to represent the 
peculiarities of human behavior that reflects the interdependence between one’s 
own wealth and that of others — an interrelation, which is one of the foundations 
of the human sociality. This is hence very clear when discussing economics issues 
that involve the social dimension of human behavior, which requires relaxing of the 
assumption that the agents only concentrate on their self-interest. 
 
Several studies have investigated the real foundation of economics when the 
agents operate choices and decisions within a social context, showing with 
undoubted clarity that individual decisions are mediated by other-regarding motives 
and by pro-social concepts, such as, fairness, cooperation, and reciprocity 
(Andreoni, 1990; Rabin, 1993; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; 
Charness & Rabin, 2002; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). 
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To understand the role of other-regarding preferences in social dilemmas, 
there are abundant contributions in literature, which show that the cooperation and 
the fairness principle contributes to the formulation of the agent's choices (Fehr & 
Gachter, 2000; Ostrom, et al., 1992; Gachter, 2007). Several analysis and 
investigations have confirmed the ability of humans to sustain cooperation 
voluntarily in case of resource dilemmas (Fehr & Leibbrandt, 2013; Andreoni, 1988; 
Casari & Plott, 2003; Charness & Villeval, 2009; Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011; 
Ostrom, et al., 1992). Furthermore, of late, the consequences of the introduction of 
other-regarding preferences in the theoretical frameworks of the management of 
commons has acquired great attention, and offers more elements of analysis for its 
application in the environmental and resource issues (Godwy, 2008; Frey & Stutzer, 
2006; Gsottbauer & Bergh, 2011; Brekke & Jhoansson-Stenman, 2008; Carlsson & 
Johansson-Stenman, 2012). 
The other-regarding motives have an important role in the management of 
renewable resources also with regard to the value of equity distribution. As Fehr 
and Fischbacher (Fehr, 2005) point out, the other-regarding preferences are ‘other-
regarding,’ which means that the agents show these preferences when they give 
value to the payoffs of the reference agents. In the context of renewable resources 
(which in their nature have an intergenerational function as resources that do not 
cater to only one generation, but serve the next generations as well) including the 
other-regarding preferences in the framework of analysis is of crucial importance, 
because the fairness principle becomes a diriment element in the decisional process 
that occurs, to determine how much to harvest and consume in order to behave in 
conformity to one’s own other-regarding preferences, with reference to others 
wealth. The others are not only those that simultaneously harvest the same resources, 
but also the successors will also start to harvest them in future, when the common 
resources are destined to an intergenerational use. Hence, the inclusion of other-
regarding preferences is essential for the equity distribution principles that affect 
the harvesting strategies taking care of the intergenerational externalities (on future 
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generations). For this reason, in the following section of this investigation, which 
has as its cornerstone the harvesting behaviors from renewable resources, the effects 
of the present-bias will be investigated in terms of reduction of the welfare of future 
generations, and with these elements it will be constructed a model that gives a 
reason for the main instances that are posed by the present-bias in this field. Because 
if on one side there are no doubts about the existence of cooperation and equity 
distribution capabilities of people — and that these capabilities are part of the 
human evolution success (Gintis, 2009); on the other side, the reason why societies 
sometimes fail to reach the level of fairness and intergenerational equity that they 
desire is unclear. This is an essential question that the observed human behavior 
poses to all the researchers, who investigate the intergenerational management of 
renewable resources; in particular, when the opportunity exists to adopt the given 
social norms that sustain the social preferences that care about the intergenerational 
distribution of the resources, keeping in mind that the capability of building a 
behavioral norm inside a community is one of the most important and peculiar 
features of human sociality. 
 
3.4. Harvesting model and biased behavior 
 
The harvesting model involves the exploitation of a stock of renewable 
resources, where at time t the stock of resources is R(t) and the amount harvested is 
expressed as h(t), where the growth of resources is given by f(g,R(t)). The 
fundamental equation that expresses the peculiarity of the dynamics of the growth 
of resources subject to harvesting is as follows: 
 
𝑅(𝑡 + 1) − 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡))𝑅(𝑡) − ℎ(𝑡)    ( 3.1 ) 
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Where f(g,R(t)) ≥ 0 and g > 0.26 
The resources are subjected to an agent’s draw, whose lifetime is defined in 
the interval (0,T). In this model the resources are materials and it is not possible to 
have a negative stock of resources. The initial level of the stock is strictly positive, 
so we have: 
 
𝑅(𝑡) ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇)                                                                                                         ( 3.2 ) 
and 
𝑅(0) = 𝑅0  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑅0 > 0                                                                                                  ( 3.3 ) 
 
The amount harvested is not restorable in the stock of renewable resources, 
such that: 
 
ℎ(𝑡) ≥ 0  ∀  𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇)                                                                                                        ( 3.4 ) 
 
According to the constraint, the representative agent is subjected to a capacity 
constraint with a non-restorable condition and also to a resource constraint. 
                                                 
26 The resources of the stock are not perishable. From this peculiarity derives the non-negative 
growth rate. And when ∂f(g,R(t)/∂R(t)=0 the growth rate is a constant exponential one. 
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The capacity constraint implies that in each period he cannot harvest 
resources amounting to greater than hmax, a value that is strictly positive and finite, 
and with the non-restorable condition implies: 
 
0 ≤ ℎ(𝑡) ≤ ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥   ∀𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇)  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ   ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥 > 0                                                  ( 3.5 ) 
 
According to the resource constraint, the agent cannot harvest at a time t more 
than the stock of resources available at the same time: 
 
ℎ(𝑡) ≤ 𝑅(𝑡) ∀ 𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇)                                                                                                  ( 3.6 ) 
 
The welfare of the agent depends only on the amount harvested and enjoyed 
in the harvesting time, and the utility function is expressed in the usual way: 
 
𝑈 = ∑ 𝛿(𝑡)𝑢(ℎ(𝑡))𝑇𝑡=0                                                                                                       ( 3.7 ) 
 
Where u(h(t)) is monotonic and strictly concave on h(t) in the interval (0, hmax). 
 
𝑢′(ℎ𝑡) > 0   𝑢
′′(ℎ𝑡) < 0                                      ( 3.8 ) 
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The discount factor δ(t) represents the degree of impatience of the agent with 
regard to the harvesting resources. The assumptions of the model exclude the case 
of neutrality in the harvesting time and of the pleasure in procrastination, δ'(t)>0,27 
such that the agent’s impatience on the harvesting time is represented as: 
 
𝛿(𝑡) > 𝛿(𝑡 + 1) ∀ 𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇)                                                                             ( 3.9 ) 
 
The representative agent, around whom the model is built, is affected by the 
present-bias, such that his discounting is led by the following features: 
 
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+𝑛
>
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+𝑛
   𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑡 < 𝑠   and     𝑡, 𝑠 ∈ (0, 𝑇)                                                ( 3.10 ) 
Of course in this condition makes time consistency is not possible. 
 
Before discussing the implication of this model in the intergenerational 
framework, in the presence of other-regarding preferences, let it be made clear that 
it has excluded the condition of no possible reduction in stock of resources, such 
that the agent is effectively faced with a dilemma about the management of the 
resources. In fact, there is no problem of impoverishment of the resources if every 
                                                 
27 When in the absence of time pressure, it will be: 
𝛿′(𝑡) = 0   𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  
𝛿(𝑡)
𝛿(𝑡+1)
= 1   ∀ 𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇). 
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possible action conforms to a no-reduction of stock. Hence in this model it is not 
possible for the agent to always harvest the maximum amount, hmax. 
Finally, we assume continuity of the harvesting amount for the interval (0, 
hmax) and given the discount factors Φ={δ(0), … , δ(t), … , δ(T)} that respond to the 
assumption of the model, we clarify that each time the agent will define just one 
optimal solution of the problem of maximization. 
 
The optimal solution is given by the maximization of the utility function ( 3.7 ) 
under the constraints expressed in ( 3.2 ), ( 3.3 ), ( 3.4 ), ( 3.5 ), and ( 3.6 ), and the 
growth of the stock follows the dynamics described in ( 3.1 ). Thus at time 0 the 
agent formulates his optimal harvesting strategy for his lifetime: 
 
𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇)}                                                         ( 3.11 ) 
 
It is well-known that a present-bias does not give guarantees about the time-
consistence of the choices time after time. In this manner the strategy effectively 
implemented by a biased agent does not coincide with the long-run optimal one. 
Hence, the strategy effectively implemented will be a biased one, and can be 
expressed as: 
 
𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑇)}                                                  (3.12) 
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Hbias is defined as the amounts that are derived time after time by the 
instantaneous maximization of the utility expressed in ( 3.7 ), under the constraint 
defined before, when the discount factor has responded to the present-bias features 
expressed in ( 3.10 ). The direct consequences will be a greater amount harvested 
at the beginning for effect of the present bias, with a lower amount enjoyed 
compressively during the lifetime: 
 
ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡
∗) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡
∗)   𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  ∑ ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=0 < ∑ ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=0                          (3.13) 
 
Where t* is the period at the beginning in which emerge the bias, where the 
revaluation of the harvesting amount for effect of the present bias differs from the 
optimal long-run amount. 
 
3.5. Consequences of myopic behaviors on the welfare of future 
generations in the presence of other-regarding preferences 
 
The issue that it is questioned here is, in which way does adoption of a biased 
strategy instead of the optimal long-run one affect the intergenerational transfer, 
given the social preferences of the agent. Therefore, here we introduce the presence 
of more agents, who in succession harvest from the same stock of resources. Hence, 
we have a second agent who starts harvesting for T periods after the previous one 
has finished harvesting for the same number of periods. Thus, we have an 
intergenerational transfer where the amount not harvested in the last period by the 
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first generation forms the initial stock of resources for the subsequent generation. 
Hence, we have: 
 
{[1+𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡))]𝑅(𝑇) − ℎ(𝑇)} = 𝐷                                                                       ( 3.14 ) 
 
Where D represents the initial stock for the second generation.  
 
Of course if the first generation is really selfish, it will not leave anything for 
the next generation. However, this solution does not respond to the real behavior of 
agents, as we have described them in our retrospective on the other-regarding 
behaviors, which shows pro-social preferences. Therefore, it is with great interest 
that it is shown the effects of present-bias on the future generations when the 
myopic agent has some sort of other-regarding preferences or behaves in 
accordance with the given social norm that sustains his other-regarding preferences. 
Hence, here we consider a case in which an agent, representative of the first 
generation, takes care of the amount available for the successor because he has some 
social preferences about the intergenerational distribution that makes him leave a 
given amount, D, unharvested, at the end of the period T. 
The amount D depends on the lifetime-expected revenue that the first agent 
(or generation) obtains given its own preferences, which it is given by: 
 
𝜋 = ∑ ℎ(𝑡)𝑇𝑡=0                                                                                                                ( 3.15 ) 
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Furthermore, by a generic constant parameter, β, that represents the 
intergenerational equity of the first generation and that we assume is spontaneously 
unchangeable during the lifetime of the agent without strong external institutional 
intervention, hence we have: 
 
𝐷 = 𝑓(𝛽, 𝜋)                                    ( 3.16 ) 
 
The amount transferred to the second generation increases with the increase 
in the total amount that the agent receives, and consequently a reduction the amount 
obtainable by the agent, reduces the amount that he chooses to leave to the successor. 
So we have: 
 
𝜕𝐷(𝛽,𝜋)
𝜕𝜋
> 0                                      ( 3.17 ) 
 
In particular we see that any time the agent operates his choice about the 
strategic plan of harvesting he proposes to follow, he also plans on how much to 
leave to the next harvester. The amount D at time t is a function of the expected 
revenue that is given by the sum of the amount harvested until time t and the amount 
that in future the agent predicts to harvest. 
We know that the amount harvested depends on the maximization of the 
utility function under the resources constraint ( 3.6 ), the dynamic that leads the 
renewal of the stock of resources ( 3.1 ), and the capability constraint and the non-
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restoring condition ( 3.5 ), and is the highest possible when agent has neutrality on 
the harvesting time. Of course any sort of discount factor that decreases over t leads 
to a low total amount.  
Hence, because we assume 
𝛿(𝑡)
𝛿(𝑡+1)
> 1∀ 𝑡 ∈ (0, 𝑇), an increase in this rapport 
determines a lower total amount harvested, π. Therefore, defining the impatience of 
the representative agent of the first generation, as: 
 
𝜌 =
𝛿(𝑡)
𝛿(𝑡+1)
                                                    ( 3.18 ) 
 
we have lower revenue, π, for an increasing impatience (strong impatience on 
harvesting), 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝜌
< 0 , from which derives: 
 
𝜕𝐷(𝛽,𝜋)
𝜕𝜌
< 0                                       ( 3.19 ) 
 
Now we consider that the agent at a given time, q, predicts a given harvesting 
amount, ȟ(t), an amount that he has to harvest at a future time t. Hence, at time q 
the optimal strategy formulated by the agent is Hopt={h(q), … ,ȟ(t), … ,ȟ(T)}. 
Given Hopt the agent predicts that he will obtain an expected revenue of πopt, 
so the predicted amount transferred is defined in function of this predicted revenue. 
The transferred amount predicted at time q is called Dopt. 
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At time q the discount factor applied at future harvesting h(t) determines and 
represents a given impatience expressed by ρq. However, we know through previous 
discussions that in the presence of a present-bias the time consistency does not hold, 
so when in a subsequent period the agent re-evaluates his harvesting strategy, the 
harvesting amount for time t will be re-evaluated with a strong impatience, we call 
the new level of impatience ρbias. Obviously, because ( 3.10 ) holds, ρbias > ρq. 
Thus, taking into account ( 3.19 ) we have that the adoption of ρbias, instead 
ρq, implies that Dbias < Dopt., where Dbias is the predicted transferred amount, 
evaluated at a time subsequent to the period q when the agent has present-bias 
preferences. 
At this point it is trivial to show that time after time the predicted transferred 
amount becomes smaller and smaller and that in the final period T, the amount 
effectively left to the future generation will be lower than the amount that the agent 
would have left to the future generation given the same intergenerational 
preferences, but without the present-bias that swept him from his long-run 
harvesting path. 
In last instance we can express the amount transferred as function of the 
strategy adopted by the agent, given his intergeneration and intertemporal 
preferences, so: 
 
𝐷 = 𝑓(𝛽, 𝛷,𝐻𝑑)                                                                                                              (3.20) 
Where the intergenerational preferences are represented by the parameter β 
and the intertemporal preferences by the set of discount factors effectively applied 
at the amount harvested, at every period, 𝛷 = {𝛿(0), . . . , 𝛿(𝑡), . . . , 𝛿(𝑇)}. 
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The strategy adopted by the agent shows us if the discounted factor applied is 
affected by present-bias or if it is a time-consistent discount factor. We can denote 
the second condition with Hdopt and the previous one with Hdbias. In the biased 
strategy, the impatience follows the rule imposed by ( 3.10 ) and we have seen the 
consequence over the amount transferred to the second generation. Thus it is 
possible summarize that, when the two strategies that the agent may implement can 
be expressed as: 
 
𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
𝑑 |
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+1
>
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+1
  ∧    𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑑 |
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+1
=
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+1
  with𝑡 < 𝑠   𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡 ∧ 𝑠 ∈ (0, 𝑇)       ( 3.21 ) 
 
and defining the amount transferred to the second generation in function of 
the two different strategies (optimal long-run strategy and the biased one): 
 
𝐷𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝑓(𝛽,𝛷,𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡
𝑑 )   ∧   𝐷𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = 𝑓(𝛽,𝛷, 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
𝑑 )                                              ( 3.22 ) 
 
It is possible assert that: 
 
𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
𝑑 ⇒ 𝐷𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 < 𝐷𝑜𝑝𝑡                                                                                                          ( 3.23 ) 
 
Therefore, a biased strategy determines a reduction on the maximum welfare 
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available for the future generation with respect to the case of absence of present-
bias. The second generation, hence, suffers the consequences of a bias that affects 
the previous generation, without, for obviously reasons, having the opportunity to 
avoid the reductions of the total welfare of the agents, in terms of total amount 
enjoyed that involves both generations, and in particular the lower welfare of the 
second generation, which consequently receives a lower initial stock of resources, 
because of the effect of the present bias on the previous generation. 
 
3.6. Advantage of the implementation of a to social norm of 
commitment with respect to spontaneous other-regarding behavior 
 
If a situation has emerged, where a naive individual is induced by present bias 
to leave to the future generation less than what he originally desired, it may be 
decisive if the individual has the chance to not merely follow his spontaneous 
behavior, but to find the support of same social norm that can to make him to apply 
some sort of commitment to his choices. In fact, we now consider the possibility 
that individuals, when determining their own harvesting strategy, must take into 
account and comply with certain social norms that require them to leave an amount, 
not amenable to revision, defined according to their intergenerational preferences 
in relation to the amount they receive, before starting their harvesting activities. The 
amount would, therefore, no longer be dependent on revaluation time and again 
according to the expected revenue, but will be restricted to the amount of resources 
available initially. 
The difference in the outcome of an intergenerational transfer would be very 
significant. In fact when individuals act in compliance with their own spontaneous 
intergenerational preferences, without being bound by any social norms, 
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substantially, for each period, they will encounter an intergenerational constraint. 
Such that: 
 
(𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡))𝑅(𝑇) − ℎ(𝑇)) = 𝐷𝑡(𝛽, 𝜋𝑡)                             ( 3.24 ) 
 
Where Dt(β,πt) is the transfer amount to the next generation, estimated at time 
t, as a function of the quantity of resource harvested and the quantity that is expected 
to be harvested from t to T, which is πt. From what we have discussed till now we 
can derive that, given the properties of present-bias, at time s > t we have 
𝐷𝑠(𝛽, 𝜋𝑠) < 𝐷𝑡(𝛽, 𝜋𝑡). Hence, the constraint with respect to the conservation of 
resources for the benefit of future generations becomes less tight and is assessed 
downward with the emergence of negative impacts of present-bias on the 
regeneration of resource stock, leading to a lower amount transferred.  
Conversely, however, the situation of the transferred amount is different if the 
agent manifests his own intergenerational preferences via compliance with a social 
norm necessitating donations to the future generation of a determined amount, set 
out before the harvesting period, and thus, defined according to the initial stock of 
resources, at time 0. This amount, which we define as Di, will not be subject to re-
evaluation, as it is independent by the time. Hence, we will define the social norms 
constraint that the agent has to satisfy for every t as 𝐷𝑖 = 𝐷0(𝛽, 𝜋0) , where 
𝐷0(𝛽, 𝜋0) is the amount that the agent predicts to transfer to the future generation, 
predicted amount defined before that he starts to harvest, the intergenerational 
constraint that the agent will encounter will be: 
 
(𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡))𝑅(𝑇) − ℎ(𝑇)) = 𝐷𝑖                                                                     ( 3.25 ) 
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With Di being fixed and unchangeable over time. So, inevitably, the presence 
of constraints arising from social norms will lead the individual to not re-evaluate 
the amount to leave to the future generation. In particular, there is a lower amount 
harvested in the initials periods of harvesting with respect to the situation in which 
the influence of present bias is not mediated by compliance to the social-norms 
constraint.28 
So defining the harvesting strategy effectively used in compliance to the 
social norm with: 
 
𝐻𝑖 = {ℎ𝑖(0), … , ℎ𝑖(t),… , ℎ𝑖(s),… , ℎ𝑖(𝑇)}                                                     ( 3.26 ) 
 
In such a scenario, in the time interval (1,s) the amount harvested in the social 
norm compliance strategy will be lower with respect to the situation of absence of 
such a norm, hence: 
 
ℎ𝑖(𝑡) < ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)    𝑓𝑜𝑟     𝑡 < 𝑠                                                             ( 3.27 ) 
 
It is obvious that a lower amount harvested at the beginning determines a 
higher amount compressively available, hence we have: 
 
∑ ℎ𝑖(𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=0 + 𝐷𝑖(𝑇) > ∑ ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡) + 𝐷𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑇)
𝑇
𝑡=0                                            ( 3.28 ) 
                                                 
28 It is redundant to explain the reasons why a no re-evaluable amount of the transfer to the second 
generation implies the constraint of conserving a greater volume of resources for future generations, 
and results in a reduction of the harvesting over the various periods, in function of the agent's 
intertemporal preferences, thus leading to lower harvesting, coinciding with the initial periods which 
saw the transferred volumes reviewed downward for effect of the present bias in the bias strategy 
without social norms with respect to the optimal one. 
Following Spontaneous Other-Regarding Preferences or Adopting Social Norms in the Intergenerational 
Transfer in Renewable Resources Dilemmas when Agents Are Present-Biased. 
92 
Thus, with a compliance strategy to a social norm representing the agent’s 
other-regarding preferences, we can ensure a transfer level to future generations that 
is not reduced by the present-bias effects, and at the same time, at the end of the 
harvesting period the total amount of the harvesting undertaken and the residual 
resource stock for the next generation will be greater. Hence the social constraint, 
while being an expression of the same other-regarding preference, offsets the effects 
of short-sighted behaviors — where a naive agent takes his own decisions only 
under the influence of present-bias — that in absence of social norms are without 
substantial embankments. 
 
Hence, the element here that assumes great relevance is the necessity that the 
possible social norms implemented have the capability to avoid re-evaluation of the 
amount of resources left to the future generation. The social norms should have the 
crucial role of to be the via of expression of the other-regarding preferences of the 
agent in the management of resources. Hence the governance of these resources 
needs to design specific norms that can make the agent to express his own social 
preferences and that can keep the harvesting path as close as possible to the optimal 
one with an high compliance to the norms. 
In fact, only the presence of the other-regarding preferences, that is necessary 
and essential, is not sufficient to guarantee the sustainability of the resources over 
time, as also the intergenerational equity. The other-regarding preference needs to 
be sustained by specific institutional mechanisms and brought into the community 
by social norms that prescribe the behaviors more appropriately, for guaranteeing 
the actual equity and availability of the resources between the different generations. 
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3.7. Discussion and final remarks 
 
Previous studies showed that when the behavior of a selfish agent was the 
result of present-biased choices, the resources collapsed (Hepburn, et al., 2010); 
and that a present-biased agent could compromise the intergenerational equity for 
public goods (Winkler, 2006). It was also shown that the choices made for the 
present-bias effect in a context of the collective management of common resources 
could lead to the triggering of a cascading defections in commons, even when this 
was supported by the cooperative preferences of the agents. The present bias did 
not question only the implementation of an optimal strategy in terms of the 
sustainability the resource stocks faced with the agent's preferences, but also 
questioned the same capacities of the agent to pursue his own welfare, a welfare 
which diminished when the individual acted under a strong emotional impact only 
based on the present, from which present-bias derives, in cognitive terms. 
Now someone with excessive aloofness from the vicissitudes of the others 
and with little curiosity about the human nature could argue about the lower welfare 
of the myopic agents derived by the present-bias, and about the reduction of their 
resources destined at the exclusive use of their own generation, that it is just the 
effect of their own choices and that anyway the choices taken respond to some sort 
of preferences (also if under the effect of the bias), and that for this reason the 
interest of the society in this problem must be marginal. Also, this sort of argument 
totally ignores the intrinsic purpose of the society, where the society is the bearer 
of the interest of individuals, groups, and communities that are part of the society 
itself. Moreover, each individual is part of a wider community where he interacts 
with the others members. In fact, as has already emerged, the common and 
renewable resources are deeply characterized by the strong interdependence 
between the actions of different subjects. 
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I do not need to remember that in the context of renewable resources the acts 
of one generation have externalities on the subsequent generations. In fact, a 
community is composed not only of the actual members, but also of the future ones. 
For this reason, I think that the effect of present-bias is a problem for a community, 
not only because it reduces the welfare of the single myopic agent and of a group 
with a more-or-less high presence of present-biased agents, but also because there 
exist intergenerational negative externalities. From these considerations is born the 
necessity to take into account the consequences of present bias, for the future 
generations also. 
Therefore, in this investigation it is shown that the choices influenced by 
present-bias lead to naive behavior, in which the harvesting strategy actually 
undertaken by the agent leads to a lower volume of total resources enjoyed. 
Therefore, what the first generation actually leaves to the second is less than what 
the first generation themselves wanted. It is essentially an intergenerational reversal 
preference, in which the original intentions of people managing the resource stocks 
gradually get influenced by the strong temptation of the present, slowly eroding the 
resource volumes left to future generations from what the optimal resource level 
society wanted to leave for posterity. In fact, here it is observed the contrast between 
what the individuals’ preferences are when they are not subject to pressures from 
the present and the choices actually made when their own preferences are 
influenced by present-bias. Thus the strategic short-sightedness imposed by the 
“dictatorship of the present” causes the agent's choices to divert away from optimal 
choices, causing a reduction in the well-being of future generations, despite the 
existence of strong social preferences. 
Thus present-bias causes serious problems in terms of intergenerational 
equity and sustainability of resource levels for future generations, even when the 
welfare of future generations is supported by attitudes and preferences, taking them 
into account. In fact, the lone desire to think of future generations does not 
Following Spontaneous Other-Regarding Preferences or Adopting Social Norms in the Intergenerational 
Transfer in Renewable Resources Dilemmas when Agents Are Present-Biased. 
95 
guarantee that actions undertaken for future generations will match what is 
considered desirable and initially optimal. Thus, resources management and 
conservation for future generations appears to be a complex task, which cannot be 
solved fully by the spontaneous behavior of agents alone.  
In fact, even if a generation has spontaneous and intrinsic intergenerational 
preferences that want to ensure sustainability of resources for future generations, 
there is the limit that in the process of decision-making about the management of 
the stock of resources over time, the choices made are insufficient to keep the 
harvesting plan, which would lead to the level of resources donated to the future 
generation initially suggested; and if that level had been defined in terms of 
sustainability for the future generation (as the result of spontaneous preferences for 
future generations), the very sustainability of resources for future generations, even 
if desired by the present generation, would be compromised. 
Faced with this problem, this study has shown that if the social preferences 
of the individual are not left only and exclusively to their own spontaneous 
behavior, and if these social preferences are expressed by social norms charged with 
representing the individual's social preferences, a mitigation of the effect of present 
bias on the intergenerational equity can occurs. 
In fact individuals express their preferences in a social context not only 
through consumption choices made in relation to the utility they and others obtain, 
but also express their preferences through specific social norms that they believe in. 
Hence, by compliance with these norms, individuals express their own preferences 
toward other members of the community. In fact, individuals with social 
preferences do not act in isolation from the community they belong to. Furthermore, 
the manner in which social norms mediate individuals’ behavior is one of the 
prerogatives of human society, which bases its very existence in that community of 
individuals, on the relatively widespread adoption of specific social norms and 
Following Spontaneous Other-Regarding Preferences or Adopting Social Norms in the Intergenerational 
Transfer in Renewable Resources Dilemmas when Agents Are Present-Biased. 
96 
clearly identifiable habits, whose adoption by an individual qualifies him/her in 
very specific terms.  
This paper, therefore, shows that the welfare of future generations can be 
preserved by respecting the preferences of the current generation and implementing 
a social norm that defines behavioral heuristics. Heuristics must be designed in a 
manner such that the social preferences of the member of the community are 
expressed not only by the volume of resources they leave to the next generation, 
but also according to how this amount matches the amount initially assessed.  
Indeed, this would facilitate the effective maintenance of resource stocks to 
be allocated to future generations initially defined according to the individual's 
preferences, which, though affected by present-bias would have a balancing effect, 
due to compliance with social norms.  
Thus it would seem useful to continue study pathways regarding the 
harvesting of renewable and intergenerational resources, highlighting the role of 
social norms as regulatory and expressive elements of an individual's will. If, in 
fact, the individual's capabilities are limited by myopia in the intertemporal 
management of resources, the social components of the same individual will allow 
him/her to follow a behavior that can mitigate such myopia with socially-accepted 
behaviors that can express their own preferences, while dampening the cognitive 
bias, which otherwise a naive agent — who by their very nature is not aware of 
acting under present-bias — cannot remedy in an isolated and spontaneous manner. 
From this point of view, social norms can also be interpreted as being tools in the 
hands of society, developed in evolutionary terms as added features that integrate 
with the individual's preferences, to ultimately define the behavior he or she 
undertakes, balancing out possible biases and myopic behaviors, in order to pursue 
the effective well-being of the individual and community. For this reason, it will be 
of great interest to follow this path of study, investigating the implementation of 
different forms of social norms and their efficacy. 
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